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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The subject matter of this thesis is both opportune
end important.
It is opportune because John Dewey himself in his
foreword to the issue of 35due at ional Trends dedicated to
his honor in 1939
,
says
:
Interpreters and critics of events are practically
unamimous in the conviction that the world is arriv-
ing at one of those critical points of history in
which a change of direction takes place, ^he signs
are manifest in our own net ion, In European and in
Oriental effalps. No one can state with an assurance
which is based upon reason whet the nature of the
ohm e is going to be. ™he forces at work ere too
vast and too precariously poised to enable us to
speak dogmatically about the future, ^e only know
that it is as if the affairs of the world were turn-
ing on a hinge, but cannot tell which way they are
going to swing.
We are sum one d, he continues, to think, to in-
quire, examine, weigh, rather than to decide, or at
least before we decide. ... There is need for a
searching re*examinat ion of our habits and our pro-
fessed principles. ... They (educators) are sum-
moned by the present state of the world to take
stock of their practices a, d even .:;ore of their
beliefs, of tie ideas, which, perhaps unconsciously
more than consciously, control what they do. ...
But I do not think there has been a time in the
history of the country when it was so fundamentally
necessary to ask what it is all about, and what the
instrument should be used for.l
1 John Dewey, "A Foreword," Educ at ional Trends .
(Northwestern University, November-December), 1939, p. 5.

2Thus, one of our greatest educators admits that the
present state of the world is one of uncertainty, and that
a revaluation of educational principles is quite necessary
for the establishment of fundamentals in education to
assure security for men in seeking truth and obtaining good.
The thesis endeavors to do just what Mr. Dewey herein pre-
scribes, demonstrating its opportuneness.
The importance of this subject is further impressed
by Mark VanDoren in his latest book in which he endeavors
to uncover the educational problem of the present in seek-
ing the kind of education which will be brought into being
tomorrow. With cogent clarity, he describes the ideal of
an education calculated to promote the largest fulfilment of
education acquired by each person, scaled to the measure of
man. He stresses the essentials in total education. He in-
dicates the need of return of some form of fundamentals based
on the "centrality of human experience. " He insists that dem
ocracy demands completely developed man and has nothing to
fear from thinking, except that the thinking may be bad. 2
Our culture has truckled to the times. It is not
manworthy. Te teach boys to be men such as we are.
!7e do not give them a training as though we believed
in their whole nature .3... The gravest danger to
education now is its own readiness to risk its dignity
in a rush to keep up with events.^
2 Mark VanDoren, liberal Educat ion (New York: Henry Holt
and Company, 1943) p. 177.
3 Ibid.
, p. 3. 4 T hlfl . , p. 5.

3Man is the only being that cm misconceive his nature.
Animals do not conceive at all. 5... Education has to
master sameness and difference no less than permanence
and change. There is no short-cut way of denying our
common nature.
6
The first postulate of a democracy is equality of
education. A democracy that is interested in its future
will give each of its members as much liberal education
as he can take.V... Liberal education has to do with
the virtues of an educated person.
8
Progressive education misses being perfect when it
ignores two things: the deep resemblances between human
beings and the importance of the human past. 9
The author could not illustrate more clearly the
purpose of this thesis than as expressed by these two author
ities and attacks the problem with firm intention of elim-
inating prejudice, of correcting misinterpretations, and of
presenting a firmer ground upon which to establish the
future education of the whole man for his place in a better
wor Id
.
In the process of this thesis the subject of educa-
tional philosophy in general will first be treated, with
consideration given to its fundamental purpose and end.
5 Ibid.
. p , 21. 8 Ibid. , p. 57.
6 Ibid.
, p. 29. 9 Ibid.
, p. 92.
7 Ibid.
, p. 33.

Then the essential principles of the educational philosophy
of Jo,hn Dewey will be explained. The next chapter or topic
will deal with the fundamental educational principles of
scholastic philosophy. The teleological principles dom-
inating the methods of the two schools will then be com-
pared, showing similarities and differences-. The final
chapter will contain reasoned conclusions from the compar-
ison for improved human learning and way of life.

CHAPTER II
THE MEANING, PURPOSE AND END OF EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY
The goal of this Chapter is to consider the aims or
ends of education, endeavoring to ascertain substantial con-
clusions for the better prosecution of en educational urogram.
All men, says G.K# Chesterton, savages or civilized,
shape their lives in accordance with a philosophy, how-
ever crude or rudimentary it may be. More important,
they seek to shape by it, the lives of others over whom
they have control. All education, therefore, centers
about a philosophy, and takes from it the color of its
ends, ideals, methods and material.
^
The subject of the thesis centers around educational
philosophy. In the elucidation of the to Die, therefore, will
be considered, first, the meaning of philosophy, then, the
meaning of education, and lastly, the meaning of educational
philosophy, for the purpose of comparing the two great edu-
cational philosophies of John Dewey and scholastic philosophy.
The object of the comparison, which must be kept in mind, is
not to reveal or discover any new facts or principles; for
-orinciples are fundamental in a nature already constituted,
and facts are the expression or experiences of that nature.
1 Gilbert K. Chesterton, Heret ics
.
(New York: Dodd,
Meade and Company, 1927) P.« 15.

6A. The Meaning of Philosophy
.
Etymologic ally the
word philosophy comes from two Greek words meaning "love
of wisdom" end drtes back to Pythagoras in the sixth
century B. C.
Plato cells it "the acquisition of knowledge."2
Aristotle writes "all men consider philosophy as
concerned with first causes and principles . "^
Descartes explains, "By the term philosophy we
denote the pursuit of wisdom ••• knowledge of truth in
its first cause."4
Xocke srys, "Philosophy is the true knowledge of
things. "5
Thomas of Aquin defines it as "the science of beings
in their ultimate reasons, causes, end principles, acquired
by the aid of human reason alone. "6
2 M. deWulf, "Philosophy." Catholic Encyclopedia (Hew
York: H. Appleton Company, 1911) XII, 26.
3 loc. Cit
.
4 Loc Cit.
5 loc. Cit.
6 C. H. Bit tie, Science of Correct Thinking (Hew York:
The Bruce Publishing Company, 1942) p. 16.

7Eant holds that philosophy is a "science of the
general principles of knowledge and of the -ultimate objects
attainable by knowledge. "7
Fichte, Hegel, Schelling and Schleiermacher , who
contributed ideas to Professor Dewey, say, "it is the general
teaching of science, Wissenschaftslehre. "8
Mercier defines it as "the profound knowledge of the
universal order, of the duties which that order imposes upon
man, and of the knowledge which man acquired from reality. "9
John Dewey explains it as "the clarification of men's
ideals to the social and moral strife of their day."10
In the most of these definitions is described the
search for the ultimate, through which the reasoner by his
very nature seeks the answer to, "What and why is it?" In
the answer to the question "Why" is found man's reasoning
to the cause.
7 M. de^ulf, Ibid.
. p. 26.
8 Loo. Pit.
9 D. Mercie^, Logique (louvain: University of louvain
Press, Fourth Edition, 1909) p. £3.
10 John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (Hew York:
The Henry Holt Company, 1920) p. 26.

8Philosophy attempts by inductive and deductive reason-
ing to enlighten men in living his life. Following correct
and true methods, assumed hypotheses may be tested by de-
ductive criteria for the establishing of principles for man's
guidance. The conclusions, however, must necesssrily be
confined to man's natural powers, and his knowledge thus
derived must be circumscribed by the limit of his inherent
capabilities.
Scholastic philosophy, as shall be demonstrated in
its proper place, adds the note of the possibility of the
supernatural to this mode of thought. It is distinct therein
from all modern philosophies.
B» The Meaning of Education . The following quota-
tions illustrate the meaning of education.
William H. Kilpatrick describes education as follows:
such a process of living as remakes life; remakes it not
once nor occasionally at long intervals, but, if possible,
remakes it continually, so that each learning experience
leaves the learner at once with a broader outlook, at
once more disposed and better equipped to go on to
further like fruitful experiences. This is what we mean
by saying education is such a process of associated living
as constantly remakes life, carrying it always to higher
and richer levels.
H
11 William H. Kilpatrick, "Education and Life," Twenty-
sixth Year Book of the Nat ional Soc iety for the Sftudy of
Education
.
Part II (Bloomington, Illinois: Public School
Publishing Company) pp» 130-131.

9John Dewey in My_ Pedagogic Greed , originally pub-
lished in 1897 and reprinted in 1940, has an extensive
description of what education is in Article I, the salient
points of which are as follows:
All education proceeds by the participation of the
individual in the social consciousness of the race ...
the only true education comes from the stimulation of
the child's powers by the demands of the social sit-
uation in which he finds himself ... this educational
process has two sides - one psychological and one
sociological ... the psychological and social sides
are originally related ... the individual who is
educated is a social individual and society is an
organic union of individuals . 12
According to Ross L. Finney:
Education is the reproductive process of society. It
reproduces the social heritage into the individual so
that it imparts to him the substance out of which his
personality is made. 13
Boyd H. Bode says:
Education is, as a matter of fact, liberation of
capacity, or in Bagley's phraseology, it means training
for achievement . 1^
12 John Dewey, Educat ion Today (Hew York: G. P. Putnam's
Sons, 1940) pp. 3-17.
13 Ross I. Finney, A Sociological Philosophy of Educat ion
(Hew York: The MaeMillan Company, 1928) p. 100.
14 Boyd H. Bode, Fundamentals of Education (New York:
The MaeMillan Company, 1930) P» 20.
I
r rrs
Herman H. Home defines it as:
the superior adjustment of a physically and mentally
developed conscious human being to his intellectual,
emotional, end volit ionel environment.-^ Broadly
speaking, the whole of life is an education, life in
all its phases is the greet school. Every agency in
life is an education.^
Education in the definition of scholastic phil-
osophy is the science and art of the directed development
of man, precisely as he is man.^7
0 . The Meaning of Educat ional Philosophy . Edu-
ce t ion is a science or art directly concerned with the
development of man in himself and his social relations.
Philosophy seeking causes and principles, directs its
rational inquiry into the subject of educating, i.e.,
the body of truths concerned and the procedures to be
followed in the light of the nature of man. Educational
philosophy is the resultant study. This is its meaning.
Its purpose is to further education. Its end is to
harmonize all existing elements for the correct development
of man.
15 Herman H. Home , A Philosophy of Educat ion (New
York: The MacMillan Company, 1911) p. 251.
16 Ibid.
. p. 7.
17 Cf. E. A. pace, "Education," Catholic Encyclopedia
(New York: R. Appleton Company, 1911) V, 295-304.
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D. The End of Educa.t ion » The end of education is one
of the most important features pertinent to the discussion of
educat ional philosophy. This subject, however, presents many
difficulties in that the term "End" is used by different
authorities in different meanings.
For John Dewey, the end is contained in action.
Ends are foreseen conseauences which arise in the
course of an activity and are employed to give added
meaning and to direct its course.
In the opinion of Finney:
The ultimate end of education is the self-
realization of all persons. But we have seen that
self-realization is to be achieved through a balanced
participation in ell the institutions of society. The
ultimate end of education is, therefore, to prepare
young people for effective participation in all the
institutions of society. The institutions of society
are the objectives of education. 19
Charles Judd says:
The goal of education is this set (training for the
larger purposes of life) in terms of a complete and
broad Education. 20
18 John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct (New York: The
Henry Holt Company, T922; p. 225.
19 Ross 1. Finney, A Sociological Philosophy of Educat ion
(New York: The ITacMillan Company, 1928, p. 93.
20 Charles H. Judd, Some Constructive ?r inciples of
Reorganizat ion . Elementary School Journal (February, 1923)
p. 413.

12
Cubberly says:
The real purpose of education, aside from the learn-
ing of a few facts end the mastery of certain abilities
that are found to be of use in later life is to train
young people how to analyze a problem ... to form good
working habits, ... to teach them to gather facts and
marshall them to form a conclusion, and to awaken in
them motives for work beyond that which the school re-
quires of them. 21
Bode says:
The schools of democracy are organized to •provide
an opportunity for individual growth and development
to the end that each may lead a happy and productive
life ... with the development of ideals and purposes
which will enable the individual to find his greatest
good in the service of the group.
^
These may be summarized as describing the end of
education as utility, finite good, self-realization, and
cit izenship.
in that it asks if these are ultimate ends. An ultimate
end as viewed by scholastic philosophy is one that is
permanent, not changing rs utility with variations of social
progress or scientific discoveries, not modified es citizen-
ship by new political theories. Their objective is beyond
21 Ellwood Cubberly, The Principal and His School (Bost
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1923, p. 401.
22 Boyd H. Bode, Fundamentals of Education (Hew York:
The L'ecT'illan Company, 1921! pp. 11-12.
Scholastic philosophy differs from this description

13
the subjective state, such as self-realization which seems
to them not the ultimate of education. This ultimate end,
however, is not exclusive and does not preclude any number
of proximate ends, among which are those contained in the
above-mentioned quotations. The scholestic philosophers
claim that there is an ultimate end which becomes the norm,
the criterion of the values of any proximate ends. This is
a final cause, a terminal of specific action, demanding
knowledge of the end preceding action and means distinct
from the end.
The foregoing is a description of the field of
educational philosophy and is indicative of the scope of
the discussion to follow regarding the comparisons of the
fundamentfls of two distinctive philosophies of education.

CHAPTER III
THE ESSENTIAL PRINCIPLES OF THE EDUCATIONAL
PHILOSOPHY OE JOHN DEWEY
In this chapter will be considered, in turn, the im-
portance of John Dewey in the educational life of our na-
tion, a short sketch of his life to ascertain the influence
which led to his philosophy and method, a consideration of
his philosophy, and a scrutiny of his educative principles
in order to elucidate as completely as possible his educa-
tional philosophy*
k» The Place of John Dewey in Education *
George E. Axtelle in a special John Dewey issue of
Educational Trends writes:
John Dewey is America's own philosopher in a unique
sense. He is not only the product of American life,
but in a peculiar way he has given expression to Amer-
ica's most basic characteristics, ideas and aspira-
tions. ••• he has done so in such a way as to create
an integral pattern out of what in their original ex-
istence was conflict and confusion. ... he would say
that he was sensitive to certain values that have al-
ready found expression in our American culture, that
he tried to analyze conditions that gave support to
these values and those conditions that threatened
their existence ... he would say that he did all this
in order that men might strive to reconstruct their
world in such a way that these values would be more
secure and wide spread — the common possession of
all.l
George E. Axtelle, "John Dewey and the Concept of
Democracy," Educational Trends (November-December, 1939),
p. 6.

15
John J. DeBoer emphasizing the influence of John Dewey
on education says of him:
If our generation should escape the doom so often pre-
dicted for it, the succeeding centuries will look back
at our age and think first of John Dewey. For thousands
of his contemporaries he has been ... a friend and aider
of those who cherish intelligence, freedom and security.
Along with Darwin and Marx, Freud and Einstein he is a
major spokesman for our modern age. 2
Delton T. Howard in estimating the power of John Dew-
ey and the hold he maintained on so many followers, analyzes
his ability as follows:
Professor Dewey, I have been informed, is as dry a
teacher as ever confronted pupils in a classroom. As a
public speaker, also, he is notoriously dull and unin-
spiring. His powers of communication are still further
handicapped by an awkward, fumbling style of writing
which makes a reader protest that he ought to learn to
say what he means and to mean what he says. ... how was
it possible for Dewey, who is anything but glib, to have
attained the position of eminence which he has held
since the beginning of the present century? The answer
... is that he had something interesting to say to peo-
ple who were interested. ... The charge so often made
against Dewey, that he uses words with strange new mean-
ings and that he invents strange expressions that fall
oddly on the ear, overlooks the fact that it was pre-
cisely his intent to develop the meanings of ideas so as
to make them more effective instruments of interpreta-
6John J. DeBoer, "The Influence of John Dewey on Ed-
ucation," Educational Trends (November-December, 1959),
p. 15.
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tion. There are three things ••• that chiefly account
for Dewey* s eminence in the field of philosophy. He
was industrious, he was timely, he was challenging 03
Paul A. Schilpp calls John Dewey, American citizen
No. 1:
I do not believe that I am in the least exaggerating
the facts if I state my belief that today John Dewey is
probably the worlds foremost democrat; and that he has
achieved that enviable position not merely by precept,
but also by personal and continuous example, ••• I
consider him typical American ••• anywhere in the Ori-
ent the question: "Who is the greatest living American?"
would immediately be answered by all cultural Orientals
with the name: 'John Dewey, of course! ' Educated and
cultured Turks and Mexicans would give exactly the same
rejoinder. Through practically every schoolroom in A-
merica ... Dewey*s influence has worked itself into the
very fibre and being of Americans, be they young or old.
... John Dewey is the great activist in philosophy •••
with the courage and the capacity to look way beyond
the mere momentary now to a more human, sane, glorious
tomorrow.4
The great contribution of Dewey to educational philos-
ophy is well established in the complete bibliography of all
his works contained in the first volume of The Library of
Living Philosophers . These books and articles are spaced
over a period of fifty-seven years and evidence an increased
output with the years.
Delton T. Howard, "John Dewey As A Philosopher,"
Educational Trends (November-December, 1939), p. 20.
4 Paul A. Schilpp, "John Dewey, American Citizen No.
1," Educational Trends (November-December, 1939), pp.23-25.
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The volume, containing a biography written by his
daughter, appraisals and criticisms by a host of follow-
ers and a few dissenters, and an evaluation and correction
of misinterpretations by Dewey himself, affords an author-
itative source to the correct teachings of Dewey, a valu-
able aid to an understanding appreciation of the educative
aims and purposes of the educator and an important refer-
ence volume for use in this thesis.
The book also indicates without question the signi-
ficant place the most prominent educators of our nation
and day accord to the educational philosopher whose ideas
and principles are to be considered in comparison with
those of scholastic philosophy.
B. A Short Sketch of John Dewey T s Life .
John Dewey was born on October 20, 1859, of solid
New England stock. His childhood and youth were spent in
the most democratic of surroundings. A product of the
public schools, he was accorded probably the one special
privilege of his life, the opportunity of attending and
graduating from the State University of Vermont.
In his boyhood days, while not too much enamored
of the formal school system, he spent much time in out-
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side reading and did his share of the chores of a New England
homestead.
President Buckham of Vermont University, a teacher
of repute, impressed young Dewey exceedingly with his So-
cratic method of teaching. From a Reverend James Marsh,
he was treated to his first contact with German spiritu-
alistic idealism, deriving ideas that "institutions of
society carried in themselves a spiritual significance
and that the Bible was inspired because it was inspiring ."5
Dewey* s readings were then directed to Comte T s Posi -
tive Philosophy and "what was said about the disorganiza-
tion of existing social life and the necessity of finding
a social function for science remained a permanent influ-
ence in his thought •"§
Encouraged by a Professor Torrey, teacher of Philo-
sophy at Vermont and by reading Speculative Philosophy , a
journal edited by W. T. Harris of St. Louis who had con-
tact with German exiles of 1848 who were ardent students
of the German school of thought, he pursued further stud-
ies at Johns Hopkins 1 University where he received his
doctorate in philosophy.
5
The Philosophy of John Dewey
, Paul A. Schilpp, Edi-
tor (Evanston: Northwestern University, 1959), p. IS.
^Loc. cit.
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At Johns Hopkins * he had further contact with Germanic
thought under the teaching of Professor George Morris, a
liberal, and Doctor G. Stanley Hall recently returned from
prolonged studies in Germany. The strong influence Hegelian
thought had over him is shown in one of his first sketches,
"From Absolutism to Experimental! sm." 7
Nominally he had belonged to the Congregational
Church in Burlington, "but his belief was not wholehearted
enough to satisfy his emotional need,"8 He found this in
Hegel who "left a permanent deposit in his thinking',^ John
Dewey writes of his own beliefs at this time:
Hegel T s ideas of cultural institutions as an objec-
tive mind ... fell in with the influence of Comte and
of Condorcet and Bacon ... the idea, upon an empirical
basis, of the power exercised by cultural environment
in shaping the ideas, beliefs and intellectual atti-
tudes of individuals remained .... It was a factor
in producing my belief that the only possible psychol-
ogy, as distinct from a biological account of behav-
ior, is social philosophy. ... Gradually I came to
realize that what the principles actually stood for
could be better understood and stated when completely
emancipated from Hegelian garb. 10
'Ibid., p. 17.
8Loc. cit
.
9Loc. cit .
IQlbid.
, p. 18.

In 1886, while teaching at Michigan he married a
school teacher whose family "background had the same pio-
neer sources as his own. Whatever skill he acquired in
so-called "intuitive" judgment of situations and persons,
he attributes to her."^ She was of deeper religious na-
ture but never accepted any church dogma. He acquired
from her the belief that a religious attitude was indig-
enous in natural experience, and that theology and ec-
clesiastic institutions had benumbed rather than promoted
it.
While at Michigan his philosophical position was
closest to German objective idealism. Stanley Hall's lec-
tures had impressed upon him the close relationship be-
tween psychology and philosophy and that a new experiment-
al psychology was needed as experiment was overthrowing
the older "rational" psychology.
William James' Principles of Psychology was much
the greatest single influence in changing the direction
of Dewey's philosophical thinking. In this work Dewey
Cf
.
Ibid.
, p. 21.
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two unreconciled strains in James f Principles , one of
them derived from the traditional view of psychology as
the theory of
,
1 consciousness* , the other from the much
more objective psychological theory which is founded on
biology.12
The latter, Dewey writes, "worked its way more and more into
all my ideas and acted as a ferment to transform old be-
liefs."13
All the while we note an abandoning of former ideas
as new theories were expounded. In the meanwhile, Morris,
his close associate-* died, and another influence in the per-
son of George H. Mead, fresh from Berlin associations, came
into his life. Mead*s interest was the bearing of biologi-
cal theories upon scientific psychology. Mead started from
the idea of the organism acting and reacting in an environ-
ment and his works became famous.
Dewey was now projecting his theories in practice
through an objective study of the learning process; atten-
tion, memory, imagination, thinking were made subjects of
^Ibid., p. 23.
13Loc. cit.
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papers and addresses at Teachers* Institutes. His "belief
became more determined that there was need of practical
experience to check and develop purely theoretical ideas.^
In 1894 he accepted an offer from the University of
Chicago to teach there. He was influenced by the fact that
the subject of pedagogy was introduced in the department of
philosophy and psychology. "The Laboratory School" popu-
larly known as "Dewey School" was founded under his direc-
tion for the purpose of affording a different kind of edu-
cation from any available in Chicago.
One of his famous books, School and Society , con-
sists of talks given to raise money for this school.
Through this school he formed many important contacts. The
friendly conflict of different schools of objective thought
in those days may be considered as the beginning of pro-
gressive education. Contact with a Mrs. Ella Flagg Young
of the Chicago school system at that time furnished sup-
plement for Dewey* s educational ideas where his own experi-
14
Cf Ibid ., p. 27.
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ence was lacking in matters of practical administration.
Thus were crystallized his ideas of democracy in the
school and in life.
Associations with the Hull House, a social settle-
ment enterprise, broadened his social views. In this
work he met another woman, Jane Adams, He names her to-
gether with his wife and Mrs. Young as inspiring him to
his greatest efforts for the freedom of activity of wom-
an.
The change to Chicago made a great difference
henceforth in the type of teaching to which he devoted
his efforts, A Professor Angell, a former student of Dew-
ey at Michigan and later of James at Harvard, became an
associate. Angell was interested in promoting functional
psychology and the movement played a prominent part in
developing Dewey 1 s logical theories,^-6 The material of
studies at this time concerned the development of moral
theory in terms of interplay of impulses, habits, de-
15
Cf
.
Ibid
. , p. 29.
Cf.Ibid., p. 32.

sires, emotions and ideas, the background of Human Nature
and Conduct published later.
On the occasion of the decennial of the founding
of the University of Chicago, one volume published by-
graduate students under Dewey's direction was called
Studies in Logical Theory . It received acclaim from James
who paid tribute to the Chicago school. This contribution
marked "a final and complete break with his early Hegelian
Idealism and the launching of his instrumental theory of
reflected thought."17
How We Think and Democracy and Education , written
later by Dewey at Columbia, were direct fruits of his Chi-
cago experience.
Friction arising from administrative changes in the
Laboratory School with growing indifference and hostilities
prompted Dewey to resign as professor in Chicago. He was
succeeded by Mrs. Ella Young.
Through the influence of J. McXeen Cattell, he was
offered a position at Columbia and in 1905 Dewey found
Ibid., p. 33.

himself in a philosophical atmosphere where the realistic
movement was in the forefront.^8 Here he met Professor
Woodbridge who taught naturalistic metaphysics of the Ar-
istotelian type. Dewey was made aware of the possibility
and value of a type of metaphysical theory which did not
profess to rest upon principles not empirically verifi-
able. The many controversies of this period however, (up
to about 1915) and his teachings to graduate students who
found his views quite foreign led to a rethinking of his
philosophic ideas. Reconstruction in Philosophy
,
Expe-
rience and Nature , and The Quest for Certainty contained
his newer views.
Dewey was all the while forming numerous new con-
tacts, but probably the one man who gave definite philo-
sophic form to Dewey* s previously scattered ideas of the
arts was Doctor Albert Barnes. His Art and Experience
is dedicated to this man who established the Barnes
Foundation, an unrivalled collection of modern paintings.
Dewey's ventures in the political field gave him
practical application for his social philosophy. His
Ci
.
Ibid ., p. 35
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long and active support of woman suffrage v/as based on the
belief that enfranchisement of women was a necessary part
of political democracy. The motto of teachers 1 unions,
"Education for Democracy and Democracy in Education" is
19
obviously taken from his works.
All his political activities are explainable by a
belief in what is called tAmericanism t now more
commonly known as 'Liberalism 1 ... in its old-fash-
ioned American sense. 2
Trips abroad to Japan, China and Russia left deep
influences upon him, especially China, which remains, next
to own, the country nearest his heart.
Dewey explains the influence of his public activ-
ities on his technical philosophy thus:
The idea that lay back of my educational undertak-
ing was a rather abstract one of the relation of
knowledge and action. My school work translated this
into a much more vital form. . .. I doubt if the
force of the idea in the theory of social action
would have come home to me without my experience in
social and political movements.... My belief in the
office of intelligence as a continuously reconstruc-
tive agency is at least a faithful report of my own
life and experience. 2 ^-
19
Cf
.
Ibid
., p. 40.
20
Ibid., p. 44.
21
Ibid., p. 45.
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This succinct account of Dewey's life is given here,
not with any idea of presenting a complete historical
treatment, but, by using a source not prejudiced against
him in any way, to trace the experiences of the educator
and the associations and contacts he made during his school
life, his teacher life, his political life, social and trav-
el life. The purpose is to appreciate the sum of the ex-
periences of him who believed experience is education. This
has prominent place in evaluating his doctrines in addition
to the application of deductive criteria. The schools of
thought he studied are quoted here by his daughter. His
writings indicate his knowledge of these schools through
use of their principles or criticism of their theories.
C. The Philosophy of John Dewey .
The philosophy of John Dewey covers a vast area and
has been the subject of the gamut of consideration from en-
thusiastic eulogy to decimating criticism. It is impossible
to treat even in general the many fields in which the philo-
sophical principles of Dewey find their ramifications. The
scope of illustration must be delimited to his conception of
philosophy in general, as it effects man who is the subject
of education.
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Philosophy, according to him has three areas of in-
quiry:
For the sake of convenience these may he provision-
ally represented in the form of three concentric cir-
cles. The first area, bounded by the innermost circle,
is occupied by reflective thought, by logic or what
Dewey now calls inquiry. In the second area are the
typical modes of human experience such as the practical
or utilitarian, the esthetic, religious, socio-ethical,
scientific. Philosophical inquiry here concerns it-
self with analyzing what these modes of experience are
... these interrelations ... how the practical or u-
tilitarian develops ... • The third area is that of
the soeio-cultural world, society in its organized and
institutional form, the world which generates what we
commonly and quite accurately call 'social questions.'
The fundamental idea then is that the primary sub-
ject matter of philosophic inquiry is a continuously
interconnected field of experience ... • Philosophy
is an enterprise of reflective thought and not only
should but can only deal with problems in a reflec-
tive or intellectual way.
More specifically Dewey himself in Philosophy and
Civilization applies his philosophical method of inquiry
to man:
Man differs from the lower animals because he pre-
serves his past experiences. ... Hence he lives, not
like beasts of the field, in a world of merely physi-
^ Joseph Ratner, "Dewey's Conception of Philosophy, n
The Philosophy of John Dewey , P. A. Schilpp, Editor (Evans-
ston: Northwestern University, 1939), pp. 49-73.
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cal things but in a world of signs and symbols • • . the
ordinary man left to himself is a creature of desires
rather than of intellectual study, inquiry or specula-
tion. Man ceases to be primarily actuated by hopes
and fears, loves and hates, only when he is subjected
to a discipline which is foreign to human nature,
which is, from the standpoint of natural man, artifi-
cial. ...A certain texture of tradition is built up;
••• • Tradition thus formed becomes a kind of norm to
which individual fancy and suggestion conform, •••
As the area of a government is extended, there is a
definite motive for systematizing and unifying beliefs
once free and floating. ... under social influences
there took place a fixing and organizing of doctrines
and cults which gave general traits to the imagination
and general rules of conduct • environment
does enforce a certain minimum of correctness under
penalty of extinction.
Gradually there grows up a body of homely generali-
zations preserving and transmitting the wisdom of the
race about observed facts and sequences of nature. ...
For a long time the imaginative body of beliefs close-
ly connected with the moral habits of a community
group with its emotional indulgences and consolations
persists side by side with the growing body of matter
of fact knowledge. ... the time came when matter of
fact knowledge increased to such bulk and scope that
it came into conflict with not merely the detail but
with the spirit and temper of traditional and imagin-
ative beliefs ... • What was to be done? Develop a
method of rational investigation and proof which
should place the essential elements of traditional be-
lief upon an unshakable basis; ... • ... that which
had rested upon custom was to be restored, resting no
longer upon the habits of the past; but upon the very
metaphysics of Being and the Universe. Metaphysics is
a substitute for custom as the source and guarantor of
higher moral and social values.
Philosophy did not develop in an unbiased way from
an open and unprejudiced origin. ... Since it aimed
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at a rational justification of things that had been
previously accepted because of their emotional con-
geniality and social prestige, it had to make much
of the apparatus of reason and proof • Because of
the lack of intrinsic rationality . it leaned over
backward ... in parade of logical form. In dealing
with matters of facts, simple and rougher ways of
demonstration may be resorted to. It is enough ...
to produce the fact in question and point to it —
the fundamental form of all demonstration.
The demand for science and philosophy was the
demand for truth and a sure standard of truth which
the new born individual might employ in his efforts
to build up a new world to afford free scope to the
powers stirring within him.
Admitting that the practical problem of modern
life is the maintenance of the moral values of civ-
ilization through the medium of the insight and de-
cision of the individual, the problem is foredoomed
to futile failure save as the individual in perform-
ing his task can work with a definite and controlla-
ble tool. The tool is science.
But a mind that has opened itself to experience
and that has ripened through its discipline knows
its own littleness and impotencies; it knows that
its wishes and acknowledgements are not the final
measures of the universe whether in knowledge or in
conduct, and hence are, in the end, transient.
Fidelity to the nature to which we belong ...
demands that we cherish our desires and ideals till
we have converted them into intelligence, revised
them in terms of the ways and mears which nature
makes possible. ... We know that such thought
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and effort is one condition of the coming into existence
of the better. As far as we are concerned i"t p is the
only condition, for it alone is in our power.
For more definite application of Dewey's philosophy
to the individual, who is the subject of education, George
E. Axtelle writes:
Dewey was early impressed with the profound signi-
ficance of culture in giving form and pattern to per-
sonality. ... The idea of the immortality of the soul
was undoubtedly an effort to give personality the per-
manence due its supreme worth. Kant with his dictum
'Treat all humanity whether in thine own person or in
that of another, always as an end, never as a means
only' ; was likewise giving voice to this growing regard
for personality. In Dewey personality was supreme.
Institutions, customs and practices were, like the Sab-
bath day, made for man, rather than man for them. ...
If the word 'Sacred' has meaning it can only be as it
may be associated with personality, for persons are the
source of all values and worth. Whatever is sacred can
derive its worth Only as it serves the needs of person-
ality.
Almost if not quite equal to his regard for person-
ality is his regard for human culture ... • Moreover
man in his inner nature can be himself only as he
shares and participates with others through the medium
of culture. ... Modern science is the culmination of
this process, for it is men thinking together in a
disciplined manner on shared problems ... •
Communication is the vehicle or medium of sharing,
of participation, of joint enterprise ... the crucial
factor in man's growth as man, in his moral and social
progress.
23Jo seph Ratner, Editor, The Philosophy of John Dewey
(New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1928), pp. 514-553.
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The great bad* in human life is whatever makes for
isolation and compartmentali zation, ... • In every
instance the failure of human intelligence can be
traced to a lack of mutuality and communication.
Consequently Dewey has faith in the capacity of
human experience to develop its own regulative stand-
ards and authorities as well as its instrumentalities.
A culture whose highest values are placed upon the
fullest realization of the possibilities of its mem-
bers ... must, therefore, make communication, partic-
ipation, and intelligence the basic features of its
method of progress and of social control itself.
These three processes in conjunction mean education
... normal expectations generalized over generations
of experience we call moral principles. This is not
to imply that moral principles are to be observed as
fixed dogmas legislating action in a static pattern
... • Moral principles like other inductive general-
ization must be treated as hypothetical ... (this is)
the role of education as a general democratic social
technology. 2^
D. Dewey 1 s Educational Philosophy .
Professor Dewey has applied his philosophy to edu-
cation in a most efficient way since the days of his
Laboratory School in Chicago. His School and Society
,
Democracy and Education and Education Today manifest not
George E. Axtelle, "John Dewey and the Concept of
Democracy," Educational Trends (November-December, 1939),
pp. 6-14.
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only a practical touch with the problem but also his deep
interest in education for the individual's sake and for
society of which man is a part»
In his Philosophy of Education he defines his edu-
cational philosophy; even more, he presents philosophy as
a generalized theory of education:
Philosophy was stated to be a form of thinking,
which like all thinking, finds its origin in what is
uncertain in the subject matter of experience, which
aims to locate the nature of the perplexity and to
frame hypotheses for its clearing up to be tested in
action. Philosophic thinking has for its differen-
tia the fact that the uncertainties with which it
deals are found in widespread social conditions and
aims, consisting in a conflict of organized interests
and institutional claims ••• • Since education is
the process through which the needed transformation
may be accomplished and not remain a mere hypothesis
as to what is desirable, we reach a justification of
the statement that philosophy is the theory of edu-
cation as deliberately conducted practice.*^
The first element in the educational system of John
Dewey to be considered is the end of education. The word
"end" is little used today in educational literature, and
in its place are found such synonyms as "objective" and
^°John Dewey, Democracy and Educati on (New York:
The MacMillan Company, 1919), p. 387.
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"aim". Scholastics deem the use of the word "end" more
fitting because it denotes a final cause, a mainspring
of action, a motive, a terminal, a possibility of achieve-
ment, something definite.
Dewey disagrees with scholastic philosophy in this
regard and while scholastics hold that the knowledge of
the end precedes action and that means are distinct from
the end, he professes the opinion that the end is con-
tained in the action,, He writes:
Ends are foreseen consequences which arise in the
course of an activity, and are employed to give added
meanings and to direct its course. 6
It leads to the notion that means and ends are
separate from one another each having its own fixed
province. In reality ends that are incapable of re-
alization are ends in name only. Ends must be formed
in the light of available means. It may even be as-
serted that ends are only means brought into full in-
teraction and integration. The other side of the truth
is that means are fractional parts of the ends. 27
Every means is a temporary end until we have at-
tained it.28
26John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct (Ne?; York:
Henry Holt and Company, 1922), p. 225.
27John Dewey, The Sources of a Science of Education
(New York: Liveright Company, 192 97, p. 59.
John Dewey, Democracy and Education (New York:
The MacMillan Company, 1919), p. 124.

The end, therefore, to Dewey adheres in the means and
is not an objective reality distinct from activity or its
source. It is the generation of consequences which give
activity meaning and motive. The end or aims to those of
the modern school are always relative
Professor Dewey states clearly the aims of educa-
tion as he sees them in Mv_ Pedagogic Creed originally
published in 1897 and reproduced in 1940. This creed
is simply and logically stated and may be used as a guide
to ascertaining his true ideas which may be more or less
obscurely written in other essays or books by him.
In the first article of his creed "What Education
Is", the purpose or aim is considered. The treatment is
a practical illustration of the application of the three
concentric circle principle already expressed in the
summary of Dewey* s philosophy. In this principle as seen
by Dewey, the areas of the individuals action tend from
.
29Cf . Ross L. Finney, A Sociological Philosophy of
Education (New York: The MacMillan Company," 1928), p. 28.
30Cf . John Dewey, Education Today (New York: G. P.
Putnam* s Sons, 1940), pp. 3-17.
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inquiry to the typical modes of human experience and thence
to the individual's contact with the socio-cultural world
about him. The individual all the while is engaged in a
"double process", or "double movement" with constant pro-
gression, integrating experiences, repeating inquiry, es-
tablishing interrelationships. This process has two sides,
the psychological and the sociological, neither subordi-
nated to the other, neither neglected. They are organical-
ly related, not as a compromise or superimposition of one
upon the other, not as a development of the mental powers
without idea of their use, not as a forced or external
process to the individual subordinating his freedom, but
as a complete possession of all powers expressed in activ-
ity in social relationships.
The end of the education of the individual is the
participation of the individual in the social consciousness
of the race, beginning at birth and gradually sharing with
maturation the intellectual and moral resources which hu-
manity has gathered together, inheriting the funded capital
of civilization.
This true education is quickened by the stimulation
which a child's powers received in his proper social situ-

ations, estimating values reflectively through responses
which others make to his own activities and expressing
them in social terms and reciprocation. The ends of
powers in the individual are determined through their
activity in social relationships. But since it cannot
be established what future conditions are to be met, edu-
cation must afford command to the individual of his ca-
pacities for ready use and application. The elimination
of the social factor from the child* s education leaves
but an abstraction, the elimination of the individual
factor from society leaves society an inert, lifeless
mass. The aim of education, therefore, is the development
of the child in social service.
The end of education, thus considered, is applied
in the other articles of the creed to the conduct of the
school, the subject matter and method of education for
social progress.
Dewey believes that the school is a social insti-
tution in which there is a process of living, called
education by him, rather than a preparation for future
living. The school must represent life, with lessons
learned through forms of life, with the life broken down

to suit the pupil's progress in maturation. The process
is simplified at first growing out of home life, with
meanings understood. Integrating associations are added
with progress determined by the fundamental principles
of community life.
Proper relations with others in a unity of work
and thought develop moral training, with the dominating
discipline emanating from the life of the school and not
from the teacher. The teacher is not supposed to impose
certain ideas or form certain habits in the children,
but, predicated on the basis of larger experiences and mo:
mature wisdom, is only to determine the manner in which
the discipline of life shall come to the child.
Since proper social life is the end of education
for Dewey, logically, the subject matter is to be deter-
mined with a view to that end. Social life gives un-
conscious unity and background to the efforts and attain-
ments of the child. The differentiation of study should
be gradual and appropriate. The subjects should be cor-
related to the child's social activities; literature
having its place as the reflex expression and interpreta-
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tion of social experience; history, presenting phases of
social life and growth; vocational aspects, being both
socially expressive and constructive; science, bringing
out the materials and processes which make up social
life; and language, a tool of communication by which one
individual shares the ideas and feeling of others.
This program is not to be considered as a succes-
sion of studies but a development of new attitudes and
new interests regarding experience. It is a continuing
reconstruction of experience. The process and the goal
are one and the same, without any standard or end outside
education itself
The nature of Dewey* s method is simply the ques-
tion of the order of development of the child 1 s powers
and interests • The active precedes the passive in de-
velopment, with ideas resulting from action and devolving
for the sake of better control. Reason directs the se-
lection and arrangement of means of action. Attention
stresses the development of imagery and interests, which
31Cf . Ibid.
, p. 12.
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manifest the state of development and prophesy the next
stage to "be entered upon, and which are to be neither
humored nor repressed lest intellectual curiosity be
weakened and interest deadened. The emotions stimulate
activities to secure right habits excluding the morbid,
thereby developing true self expression, not mere for-
malism and routine.
In fine, education is to Dewey, the fundamental
method of social progress and reform, a regulation of the
process of coming to share in the social consciousness in
which due regard is shown both the individualistic and
socialistic ideals. The community has a paramount moral
duty to foster this education, formulating its purposes
and organizing its means and resources in the direction
it wishes to move.
Education thus conceived by him, is the most per-
fect and intimate union of science and art conceivable
in human experience. Nay more, it is a religion, for he
says that in this educational system the teacher always
is the prophet of the true God and the usherer in of the
true kingdom of God, 32
Cf . Ibid . , p. 17.
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E. Summary of Dewey T s Educational Philosophy
.
John Dewey in his educative principles has broken with
tradition and has formulated a new conception of life Y/hich,
he maintains, is demanded by modern developments*
He regards philosophy as primarily practical, not
contemplative. Its concern is an individual situation of
human life in which experience is the only reality and
change characteristic. Principles and truths on this ac-
count are not fixed and universal, but mutable and particu-
lar. They are constantly in a condition of becoming and by
the assumed character of evolution eventually become more
and better adapted to the condition of man. The insistence
on the present situation arises out of the evolutionistic
idea that heed for felt needs leads to advancement.
The philosophy of Dewey is a pragmatic, positivistic
experimental ism. It exalts the province of sense, while
depreciating the province of the intellect. Underlying the
pragmatic theory is the evolutionistic postulate that mul-
tiplied change will eventually result in progress. Mind is
an acquirement built up by activity in interaction with
environment. Mind is the resultant expression of a long
series of biological forces of variation and selection.
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It is an attitude of participative response in social af-
fairs.
The theory of evolution explains man's origin.
Man's home is nature; his purposes are dependent for execu-
tion upon natural conditions, Man's life is continuous
with nature, Man's destiny is earthly according to this
naturalistic and experimental conception of life. There
is no supernatural. The highest good is self realization
gained by cooperating with others for one's own upbuilding
and reacting to the life one meets in the contribution.
Good is always found as a present growth of significance in
activity.
There are no permanent ends, no absolute values, no
stable moral laws based on the nature of right and wrong.
As in the intellectual life there are no fixed, principles,
so in the moral life there are no fixed laws or ends.
Satisfaction, feeling, or utility becomes the criterion of
action and morality.
The instrumentalist theory finds its educative ex-
pression in "learning by doing". Motivation consists in
identifying self .with the activity under way. Education
is one with growing; it has no end beyond itself.

CHAPTER IV
THE EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY OF SCHOLASTICISM
A, Explanation of the Term Scholasti cism .
Scholasticism is a term used to designate both a
method and a system. It is applied to theology as well
as philosophy; referring to theology it is distinguished
from patristic theology and positive dogmatic theology
and is known as speculative; in philosophy the name is
used to designate a period of philosophical thought from
the fifth century to approximately 1450
The word scholastic is derived from a Greek word
of practically the same letters meaning a professional
philosopher, master or teacher.
The scholastic system, which grew out of the aca-
demic curriculum, sought to answer the questions that vexed
the minds of Christian thinkers: How are we to reconcile
reason with revelation, science with faith, philosophy with
theology? It arose from the study of dialectic in the
schools battling on the one hand against the mystics, who
condemned the use of dialectic, and on the other hand, the
authority of revelation until tested by the standard of
reason.
-"-Of. William Turner, "Scholasticism," Catholic Ency
clopedia
, pp. 548-552. Cf . Dagobert D. Runes, Dictionary
of Philosophy (New York: Philosophical Library, 1942),
pp. 280-284.
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B. The Philosophy of Scholasticism .
Scholasticism is a rationalistic movement. It is not
indeed so extreme as Abelard and Roscelin would have it,
maintaining that reason could prove supernatural mysteries.
It applies dialectic to the study of nature, of human nature,
and of supernatural truth. Scholastic philosophers acknowl-
edge the authority of revelation, but make use of human
reason, a3 far as possible, in verifying dogmas of faith.
Revelation doe3 not coerce their reason. In pnilosophy
and natural science, it teaches emphatically that the argu-
ment from authority is the weakest of all arguments. Reason
is not subordinated to authority in any unworthy sense.
^
Philosophically, scholastics adopted the details of
the Aristotelian system, known to the Latin world from
Boethius. Technically it is a system of moderate realism,
claiming that all knowledge is derived from sense knowledge
and that intellectual knowledge differs from sense knowledge,
not only in degree but in kind. Innatism, the theory that
all or some ideas are born with the soul and have no origin
in the world outside man, and sensism, the doctrine that
intellectual knowledge is only sense knowledge of a higher
or finer sort, are both reproved. scholastics opposed
subjectivism and held that there is an external world
2 Cf. Turner, Ibid.
,
p. 550.
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which is real in itself and independent of our thoughts.
Forms exist in the world which make things to be what they
are* These forms received in the mind, through sense
perception, cause man not to be the object, but to know
the object external to him. Man is aware first of the
objective reality, not of a representation thereof in him-
self.
Matter and form are the fundamental bases applied
to both organic and inorganic nature. The form is de-
scribed as striving always for its own realization or
actualization. Its purpose is not an unsatisfactory
vagueness ascribed to nature itself but is attributed to
the intelligent, provident Maker of nature. The principle
of finality, thereby, is given a more precise meaning which
excludes any pantheistic interpretation*
Scholastics maintain that the nature of man is an
individual materiality existing with a conjoined spiritual
principle which is the source of thought activity. The
exercise of the senses is a process from the soul through
the body. The soul is the principle of life. Man is a
compound of body and soul, each an incomplete substantial
Cf . Albert Stockl, History of Philosophy
,
(London:
Longmans, Green, and Company, 1922 )~~T," pp . 369-418.
CF. William Turner, History of Philosophy
,
(Boston: Ginn
and Company, 1903), pp. 268-397.
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principle, but vital and substantial when united. The body
contributes to the life of the individual by supplying the
materials out of which the intellect produces ideas. The
active intellect is part of the individual soul, immaterial
in itself.4 This soul, immaterial and spiritual, is held
to be immortal .5
Scholastics also predicate the freedom of the will
or rational appetency to the human being composed of
body and soul defining it as: the faculty of inclining
towards or striving after some object intellectually
apprehended as good ••• the capability of self-
determination. By self is meant not the series of
my mental states, nor the conception of that series,
but the abiding real being which is subject of these
states. ... that property in virtue of which a rational
agent, when all the conditions required to elicit a
volition are present, can either put forth or abstain
from that volition. 6
Scholastic metaphysics enhancing the Aristotelian
system discusses completely the nature of personality,
the existence of a first cause and the development of the
doctrine of the providential government of the universe.
The profoundest distinctions of matter and form, potency
*Cf. Turner, Ibid . t p. 551. Quoting St. Thome, s,
"De unitate Intellectus."
5Cf . Michael Mahar, Psychology (London: Longmans,
Green and Company, 1923), pp. 553-578.
6Ibid.
, p. 395.
f •
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and actuality, substance and accident are applied to every
department of thought. They recognized that in practice
scientific methods begin with observation of facts. They
excelled in the power to grasp abstract general principles
and apply them consistently and systematically.
Ethically the system is Aristotelian, seeking to
justify and expound Divine law and the Christian standard
of morals. It rests on the fundamental notion that happiness
is the supreme good of man, the realization or complete
actualization of one*s nature, regarding virtue as an
essential means to that end.
Man, according to them, is naturally a social and
political animal, with a nature requiring the cooperation
of other human beings for its welfare • Man is ordained
for society and government should exist for the common
welfare. The end for which the state exists is not merely
"vivere" but "bene vivere. "?
7Cf. Pope Leo XIII, "The Study of Scholastic Phil-
osophy," The Great Encyclical Letters of Pope Leo XIII
,
Trans. (New York : Benziger Brothers, 1903)
, pp. 34-57»
Cf . P. L. Taparelli, Saggio Teoretico di Dritto Naturale
Prato: Tipografia Giachetti, Figlio e C, 1883), pp. 131-154.
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^ • ^e Meaning of Educat ion to the Soholast ic
Philosopher .
Education in the teaching of the scholastic is:
that form of social activity whereby under the
direction of mature minds and by the use of adequate
means, the physical, intellectual and moral powers
of the immature human being pre so developed as to
prepare him for the accomplishment of his life work
here rnd for the attainment of his eternal destiny.
8
Scholastic philosophers teach that education has
an end, a final cause, which precedes the action and uses
means to that end, distinct from the end. This end has a
definite entity and objective existence in the world of
reality. Aims are not always relative. Admittedly many
aims frequently lose the form of finality, but scholastics
deny that there cannot be an end of its nature ultimate,
celled the First and Final Cause. Nor does this doctrine
preclude any number of proximate ends, more or less im-
portant, taking their makeup from the ultimate end, which
becomes the norm of education and the criterion of values.
This ultimate end must exist externally to man's mind and
apart from man's thought, because the ultimate end of a
universal activity cannot exist as a subjective state. 9
8 E.A. Pace, "Education," Catholic Encyclopedia
.
V, 296.
9 Cf. John D. Hedden and Francis A. Hyan, A Catholic
Philosophy of Education
, (Milwaukee: The i>ruce Publishing
Company, 1942), pp. 86-100.
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Scholastic philosophy declares this objective end,
permanent of its nature, cannot be found in the individual
who is transient, nor in society which is temporal, nor in
material which is finite and limited. It must be a limit-
less or ultimate end. This end can be but one, as infinity
is one. This is their norm of determination or measurement
for institutions, culture and methods, the fundamental
principle of scholastic education.
Scholastics, however, in stressing the absolutely
ultimate end do not preclude the possibility of attaining
a relatively ultimate end in temporal life, essentially
transitory. They hold that there is such an end and that
it must be provided for in education in the social life.
This relatively ultimate end is character. "Character is
life dominated by principles."^0
Character is a stability of action of an intelligent
principle acting from motives it approves and with rational
norms based on human nature. Conduct having this foundation
is governed by reason. It is expressed in act characterized
by unity of thought and constancy of behavior. This con-
sequent mode of action, arising not from the intellect
alone, for knowledge may be developed without will to act,
u Ernest R. Hull, The Formation of Character (London:
Sands and Company, 1909), p. 10.
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nor from the will alone which may be predicated on impulse
or dictating external circumstances , has an objective value
in itself*
Scholasticism, therefore, requires the forming of
character as well as the development of intellect in its
process of education. Guiding principles of character and
management of life predicated on the purpose of life as
established in human nature are patterned as postulates of
ethical conduct.
Scholastics maintain, moreover, that there are other
important ends of education called proximate. These proxi-
mate ends are both legitimate and necessary. They are out-
growths of man f s normal relationships. These are admitted
in Pope Pius XI's Encyclical "Christian Education of Youth":
... education consists essentially in preparing man
for what he must be and what he must do here below in
order to attain the supreme end for which he was cre-
ated,n
Man achieves his end through the use of his natural
powers and ordinary relationships. Major proximate ends of
education are the development of the body, intellect, will
and social life. Others, more or less subordinate to these,
are physical culture, health, vocation, citizenship,
Pope Pius XI, "Christian Education of Youth," Five
Great Encyclicals
, Trans. (New York: The Paulist Press,
1939), p. 39.
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domestic training, recreation and social communication.
Understanding the major objective of scholastic education
as a stable norm of measurement of values, each of these
may fittingly find its proper place without confusion of
thought or activity.
The material of education is undeveloped child
nature with its innate capabilities and potencies for
perfection. The content is the inheritances of the human
race, all knowledges, beliefs, customs, cultures, experi-
ences and skills accumulating from age to age and pressing
to the peak of ma^s spiritual and social accomplishment*
Not all the accumulated material is of equal value, nor of
equal value to every one. Not all of it can be compassed
by any one individual or group. Scholastics hold, there-
fore, that there must be selection in education. They
seek the essential knowledge which man must have and which
is expedient for him to learn for his proper place in life
and the prosecution of his destiny. This leads the
scholastics to ask who shall select or how shall the content
be selected and upon what basis is the selection to be made.-*-2
Scholastic philosophy finds the answer in the funda-
-^Cf. Redden and Ryan, Ibid., pp. 103-119. Cf. Pope
Pius XI, Ibid
. , pp. 37-68.
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mental nature of the individual and in the First Cause which
directs man to his purposeful development for attainment of
his last end. The norms of selection will be both positive
and negative, the first requiring a program containing
knowledge necessary to attain that end, hence must include
religion and morality; the second, must exclude rigidly
what conflicts with or militates against that attainment.
Character, built upon the will closely coordinated and
cooperating with the intellect, will require exercise,
activities, and disciplines to strengthen the will and
quicken the intellect for correct functioning in the light
of the ultimate end. Proximate ends, whatsoever current
civilization may so design, may be included in the content
provided the ultimate or relatively ultimate end is not
sacrificed. Scholastic education, therefore, maybe as
comprehensive and as liberal as any type of education save
only when there is a negation of some fundamental principle.
Pope Pius XI gives us the aim of education as stressed
by scholastic philosophy:
It is, therefore, as important to make no mistake in
education as it is to make no mistake in the pursuit of
the last end, with which the work of education is inti-
mately and necessarily connected. In fact, since edu-
cation consists in preparing man for what he must be
and for what he must do here below, in order to attain
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the sublime end for which he was created, it is clear
that there can be no true education which is not wholly
directed towards man*s last end... .13
D. The Educational Philosophy of Scholasticism .
Every school of education has a philosophy of life
which more or less determines its makeup* The philosophy
of scholasticism from the view point of reason alone has
already been outlined. The rational conclusions of this
philosophy have been applied in a reasoned manner to
education as scholastic philosophers define it. In a
broader way the educational philosophy of scholasticism
will now be considered with its reasoned foundation of
end and purpose and the added elements of revelation and
14Christian principles which make this system unique.
This system is predicated first upon the fundamental
elements of man^ nature, ma^s destiny and his relationship
with God. This constant is irrespective of time, place and
circumstance. It admits variable factors modified by many
and various conditions.
All experiences and researches of science, all testi-
mony and traditions of men demonstrate the sameness of basic
human nature from earliest historical times to this day.
Pope Pius XI, Ibid., p. 38.
:Cf. Redden and Ryan, Ibid
. , pp. 6-9, 546-549.
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Men through the ages have possessed and manifested the same
mental powers of judgment, reasoning, memory, imagination,
and abstractions, the self-same expression and reaction to
fundamental passions and common human experiences of "birth,
life, death, love, joy, and sorrow. This universal experi-
ence denotes man, as he is man, constant in himself with a
physical body and an activating principle which may be
discerned from the expressions of his peculiar nature having
a rational appetency which differentiates him from all other
creation. Education, therefore, must be suited to and
15
worthy of this preeminence.
The second fundamental principle is man's end or
destiny. The universal consent of man places the human
being above created objects about him in acknowledging man
as their master. The correct reasoning of thinking men has
discerned the peculiar character, inherited by man, as the
adherence of a different end and destiny above and beyond
that of other visible creation. Man's definite peculiar-
ities and potentials demand more than limited factors for
satiation and require creations not circumscribed by time
but without end. No system of education, therefore, is
Cf • IMd. , pp. 341-347.

55
complete which ignores or neglects this purposeful end of
"I C.
the rational animal.
The third fundamental principle is the relation of
the creature to the Creator, of the conserved to the
Conservor. Mm hps not the power to modify or destroy it.
"tfhrtever human progress or scientific advance may fabricate
to enhance man's conditions of living, the essence of men,
as he is man, will not thereby be altered. Man did not make
himself, but was made as he is. Man cannot continue his
natural life indefinitely, no matter how great the scientific
discoveries for the prolongation of life, or the determined
will of man to live on earth. No program of education,
therefore, will be worthy of man which refuses to acknowledge
the dependence of man upon God or attempts to make man some-
thing greater than his fundamental nature will permit. 17
The elements of scholastic educational philosophy,
recognizing the inflexibility of these fundamentals, maintain
thrt there is a proportionate stability and permanence of
purpose in education, while admitting and encouraging any
variables within the limits of man T s nature for his im-
provement •
16 Cf. Franz DeEovre, Trrns., Philosophy and Education
.
(Hew York: Benziger Brothers, 1930), PP* 38-42.
17 Cf. Redden and Ryan, Ibid.
. pp. 191-213, 566.
Cf
. Alessandro Manzoni, Sulla"
"
£iorgle Oattolica Osservazioni
.
(Roma: Presso Vincenzo Poggioli, 1826), ppt 37-116.
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Scholestic educational philosophy also contains a
certain constancy of method based again upon man's nature.
"Every man is born, equipped with an undeveloped physical
and mental organism. There is no other known way of
attaining adult life than progressive growth from babyhood,
childhood end adolescence to manhood. There is no known
way in which this progress can be radically modified.
Science has improved technique, but has not seriously
altered natural progression. The physical laws of the
senses, the nervous system and equipment, the principles
of mental life, the qtiickening of attention, observation,
comparison, abstraction, judgment, volition, ere ell sub-
servient to the growth of the intellect. .Natural learnings
cannot be discarded no matter how disguised by devices.^
The content of education recording to scholastic
philosophy has a definite permanence because of fundamental
truths and relationships of life which are persistent.
Common factors are found in every man's life, food, clothing,
shelter, etc., which have been more or less stable through
the years of historic life. Common knowledges have a
similar strain through the years. Newer techniques of
learning have made the process pleasant er, but the basic
18 Cf. Ibid.
. pp. 330-363 and 143-186.
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methods remain. Human intelligence is stable and the re-
sultant of introducing ways of learning to the subject will
be as practically constant as accidental individual differ-
ences permit.-'- 9
The variables, conditioned by man's physical equip-
ment, environment and social relationships, may be diverse,
striking, and conspicuous but. offer scholasticism an
opportunity of their use for the progressive perfection of
man. Whatever contributes to the body's health or improve-
ment proportionately contributes to the soul's perfection
of knowledge. Programs may be flexible in that they must
be adjusted to the individual's capacity to learn. Environ-
ment must be conducive to development or improved as suitable
means for man's dignified end. Political, social and
economic environments, different in the various areas of
time and region, will require special methods adaptable to
specific situations. All betterments are readily encouraged
when predicated upon the fundamental basic elements of man's
good and his end. 2^
Scholastic educational philosophers prescribe in
addition the training of the will. To them the essential
quality necessary for the harmonious development of the wel 1
balanced human being to a common end is the freedom which
19 Cf. Ibid.
. pp. 30-31.
20 Cf. Ibid.
, p. 91.
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dictates it. All naturel powers should function in educetion,
without over-emphasis on eny one in psrticulsr. Education is
not to be imposed from without, but is s process developed
within. The child is not only the center of activity of the
learning process, but jLs the activity end the child becomes
his own educator. The freedom of the will in this exercise
is neither irrationality nor caprice, but the following of
the antecedent action of the intellect which presents a
choice of goods. The good presented produces in the will a
corresponding attraction or repulsion, a clash of desires
which demands the necessity of choice. The morality of
deliberate human acts rests in the quality of this choice.
It is as equally necessrry, therefore, to develop the power
of volition as to supply knowledge. The development of this
power begins with the child in sense cppetency, when in-
stinctively attraction is eroused. It later is influenced
by impulse. Irter still, when the powers of the rational
will come into ascendance with the learned use of reflective
and deliberate powers, motives then control choice. The
child must learn to use his will as he did his intellect,
through experience. This training is not to be found in
bodily unrestraint, nor impulse, nor external pressure,
nor compulsion, but in teaching the recognition of the
higher good and thus establishing principles of good conduct,
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by allowing the child to use freedom in situations where all
the elements tend to make habitual the practice of acting
from sound principles.
The educational scholastics find the basis of morality
implanted in the nature of man. The natural virtues are the
outcome of this law found in human nature. It exists apart
from religion but not in contradiction. It has an objective
existence, but scholastic philosophers maintain that it is
neither practical nor possible to teach morality apart from
religion, as morality would then lack proper motivation.
Education is the development of power and power is the out-
come of exercise. The child cannot assent to social prin-
ciples as reasonable before he has learned to accept the
idea of society. Nor can he accept the idee of the innate
dignity of man before he has compassed the concept of man.
Morality sanctioned by religion affords the proper motiv-
ation at all stages of life for the harmonious growth and
development of all the powers of soul and body.
It has already been indicated that scholastic phil-
osophy admits revelation as an influence and the principles
of Christ as fundamental in education. This will novy be
further developed*
The Jews occupied a unique position among pre-Christian
people as the recipients and custodians of Divine revelation.
21 Cf. Mahar, Ibid ., pp. 378-424
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They accepted God as their teacher and their standard of
righteousness. Their ritual services were types and a
preparation for the Messiah. The advent of Christ as God,
rnd the establishment of Christianity fulfilled the
prophecies of the Old Law end is the most important epoch
in the history of mankind for scholastic philosophers who
are followers of Christ.
Scholastic philosophers supplement the principles
of education as found in nature through reason with the
teachings of Christ es God. That Christ lived is an es-
tablished historical fret. That He is more than man is
proved by His miracles, the greatest of which was His
Resurrection. Scholastics point as proof to the results
of the methods of historical criticism applied to the
facts. This Christ claimed He was God and gave proof of
His Divinity. He came for a purpose and fulfilled it in
His life and by His death. He was to teach truth and the
way of life. He, Himself, declared:
I am come a light into the world; that whosoever
believeth in me, may not remain in darkness. 22
For this was I born, and for this came I into the
world; that I should give testimony to the truth. 2^
22 The Holy Bible
.
Douay Version, translated from Latin
Vulgate, (Hew York: John Murphy Company, 1914) John XII, 46.
23 John XVIII, 37
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I am oome that you may hsve life, and may have it
more abundantly. 2^
I am the way, the truth and the life. 25
The works themselves whioh L do give testimony of
me, that the Father hath sent me. 2 ^
Hot every one that saith to me, Lord, Lord, shall
enter into the Kingdom of Heaven: but he thet doth
the will of my Father. 2
"
Scholastics believe the testimony of Christ as to
His God-head and the teachings which He gave to man as
above or supra nature but not in contra diet ion to it.
Christ's doctrines made no appeal to pride, selfishness
or passion. Scholastics hold education is the antithesis
of these. Christ's teachings *.-ere referred to as "hard
sayings". Scholastics realize that His doctrines may be
"hard" if we make self the center of life, but point to
them as correct teachings for obtaining the end of man
and in no way a contradiction of nature. Christ taught
the duty and necessity of serving civic good for man's
life on earth and gave as the sanction, which imparted
force to such obligations, the fact that man's maker is
24 John IX, 10.
25 John XIV, 6.
26 John V, 36.
27 Matt. VII, 21.
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God and his last end a higher citizenship in the Kingdom of
God, To strive for this end is the ideal of men's life to
v/hich every other good is subordinate.
Seek ye first the Kingdom of God, and His justice,
and all these things shall be added unto you. 28
The tenets of educational philosophy, namely, that
we lerrn by doing, rnd that knowledge gets its full value
only when it issues in action, finds its best exemplifi-
cation in Christ's dealings with His Apostles. 29 He used
the simplest things in nature to illustrate lessons of
deepest significance. His aim was to instruct by asso-
ciations, making use of daily experience. His whole
teaching is clearest proof of the principle that education
must adapt itself in method and practice to the needs of
those being taught.
Scholastics hold Christ's mission did not end when
He quitted the earth, and that He made ample provision for
the perpetuation of His work in the selection of a body of
men called apostles to carry on this teaching. He
commanded these men:
Going, therefore, teach ye all nations ... and behold
I am with you all days, even to the consummation of the
world. 3°
28 Matt., VI, 33.
29 E. /. Pace, Ibid.
. p. 299.
30 liatt.
,
XXVIII, 19.
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Scholastics teach that if Christ was God, and they
apply every known principle of methodology end reason to
ascertain the proof, these words are not vain and His teach-
ing is still carried on in the institution He established
which may be known by four marks; one, holy, catholic and
apostolic
.
Scholastics point out that it would be wrong to
infer thet Christianity in its "otherworldliness " neglects
or depreciates the values of the present life. Consistently
they maintain that natural life receives its highest value
from service as a preparation for a life to come, that man
should profit by opportunities in this life to procure
security in the other. Complete living cannot be attained
if no consideration is given to the ultimate purpose of
life.
Finally, the scholastic position may be made clear
by the following outline, the summary of Doctor E. A. Pace
of Catholic University, in concluding his article on
education in the Catholic Encyclopedia. The author desires
to give full recognition to Doctor Pace and Doctor William
Turner of the same University, in addition to sources
quoted in footnotes, for the material used in this description
of the educational philosophy of scholasticism.
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1. Intellectual education must not be separated from
moral and religious education. To impart kno?/ledge or
to develop mental efficiency without building up moral
character is not only contrary to psychological law,
which requires that all the faculties be trained, but
is also fatal both to the individual and society ... .
2. Religion should be en essential part of education;
it should form not merely an adjunct to instruction in
other subjects, but the centre about which these are
grouped and the spirit by which they are permeated. The
study of nature without any reference to God, or human
ideals with no mention of Jesus Christ, or of human
legislation without Divine law is at best a one-sided
education. ...
3. Sound moral instruction is impossible apart from
religious education ... if ... duties towards self and
neighbor are sacred, the duty towards God is immeasur-
ably more sacred. ... Training in religion, moreover,
furnishes the best motives for conduct and the noblest
ideals for imitation, while it sets before the mind an
adequate sanction in the holiness and justice of God.
Religious education ... is more than instruction in the
dogmas of faith or the precepts of the Divine law; it
is essentially a practical training in the exercises of
religion. ...
4. An education which unites the intellectual, moral,
and religious elements is the best safeguard for the
home, since it places on a secure basis the various re-
lations which the family implies. It also ensures the
performance of social duties by inculcating a spirit of
self-sacrifice of obedience to law, and of Christian
love for the fellow man... • The welfare of the state,
... demands that the child be trained in the practice
of virtue and religion no less than in the pursuit of
knowledge
.
5. Far from lessening the need of moral and religious
training, the advance in educational methods rather
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emphasizes thet need ... • Provided the essentials of
Christien education ere secured, the Church welcomes
whatever the sciences may contribute toward rendering
the work of the school more efficient.
6, ... parents ere bound in conscience to provide
for the education of their children, either et home
or in schools of the right sort. As the bodily life
of the child must be cared for, so, for graver
reasons, must the mental end moral faculties be devel-
oped. 31
E. Summary .
Scholasticism is a philosophical system founded
upon reason. It is Aristotelian in character recognizing
matter and form as the fundamental bases of all objective
knowledge. It maintains the following main principles.
Men is a rational creature composed of a body and a soul
which is the source of thought activity, lien also hes the
capability of self-determination or freedom of the will, a
faculty which differentiates man from all other animals.
Man hes a cause and a distinct end or destiny which may be
discerned from reflective applicetion of rational thought
to teleological effects. Scholest icism recognizes revela-
tion and the teachings of Jesus Christ as God as a supple-
ment to reason in directing men to his purposive end.
These supplementary principles ere in no way e contradiction
to reason or to the nature of man.
31 E. A. Pace, Ibid.
. p. 304.
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Scholasticism applies this philosophy of life to
education in r reasonable manner. It recognizes the
existence of ends objective in themselves. It determines
the end of education from the very nature of the one to
be educated. It recognizes the existence of absolute
values which must necessarily give a certain permanence
to education. It admits variable elements as proximate
ends with which education may deal as comprehensively
and liberally as possible, provided there is no negation
of any fundamental principle. In addition to all that
reason may supply, the principles of Christ, the greet
Teacher, are applied in their educative process.
Religion is required by reason of the dependent
state of man upon His Creator and as demanded by the
supernatural as well as the natural makeup of man. Re-
ligion is exacted as an adequate sanction for morality
and to supply essential motivation to the individual to
seek his proper end. It is necessary for society in
order that mutual reciprocation of the recognition of
individual rights and obligations may be engendered for
the correct direction of society to its end.
Scholasticism seeks the education of the whole man
to a full life in this world and to a complete life here-
after. It is universal and objective in its application
regardless of time, place, or social conditions.

CHAPTER V
SOME COMPARISONS OF THE B/SIC EDUCATIONAL
PRINCIPLES OF THE T7/0 SCHOOLS.
In preceding chapters, educat ional philosophy in
general, and the essential principles of the philosophy
of John Dewey end scholasticism regarding education have
been considered.
Further light will be cast on the two systems in
the present chapter which examines in comparison some of
their basic educative principles. It is necessary to
delimit this comprrison to fundamental principles. The
discussion of each, however, will be of sufficient length
to disclose with greater exactness the important elements
of each school. It may be pointed out that contrast would
be a better word to use in this connection as the two
schools are at opposite poles regarding these fundamentals.
Moreover, it should be kept in mind that, while the
contrasts found in this chapter concern only the fundamental
educational philosophy of the two schools, scholastics
recognize proximate ends of education together with variables
and make use of every improvement in proper educational
method for the progressive perfection of man. All scientific
betterments, as explained in the last chapter, are readily
encouraged and made use of by them, provided these do not
deter man from his last end nor impugn the fundamental ele-
ments of man's nature and destiny.
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In order, will be discussed: (A) the aims or ends
of educrtion held by the systems; (B) the precise meaning
attached to values by erch system; (C) the fundamental
philosophy of naturalism and supernrturalism cS it affects
each school; and (D) the basis of morality in the practical
order upon which each predicates its methods.
A more comprehensive explanation and evalustion of
the educative principles of John Dewey and scholastic phil-
osophers will now be related in the comparison of the two
schools on the vital issues above described.
A. Concerning the Aims or "Ends of Educat ion .
This subject hes already been generally discussed
in a preceding chapter. An enlargement of the issue is
now given in order to stress the contradictory positions
of Dewey and that of the scholastic philosophers regarding
"ends" in education.
Dewey assumes that
:
the aim of education is to enable individuals to
continue their educe tion--or that the object and re-
ward of learning is continued capacity for growth.
Mow this idea cannot be applied to all the members
of a society except where intercourse of man with
man is mutual, and except where there is adequate
provision for the reconstruction of social habits
and institutions by means of wide stimulation arising
from equitably distributed interests, /nd this means
a democratic society. In our search for aims in
education, we are not concerned, therefore, with find-
ing an end outside the educative process to which
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education is subordinate . Our whole conception forbids.
Te are rather concerned with the contrast which exists
when aims belong within the process in which they oper-
ate and when they are set up from without, and, the
latter state of affairs must obtain when social re-
lationships are not equitably balanced. For in that
case, some positions of the whole social group will
find their aims determined by an external dictation;
their eims will not arise from free growth of their
own experience, and their nominal aims will be means
to more ulterior ends of others rather than truly
their own.l
Dr. Dewey then goes on to define what he means by
the nature of an aim which he describes by the contrasting
of mere results with ends .
Since aims relate always to results, the first
thing to look to when it is a question of aims, is
whether the work assigned possesses intrinsic con-
tinuity ••• it is nonsense to talk about the aim
of education ... where conditions do not permit of
foresight of results the aim as a fore-
seen end gives direction to the activity ... as
persons concerned in the outcome, we are partakers
in the process which produces the result. The net
conclusion is that acting with an aim is all one
with acting intelligently.
Mind is capacity to refer present conditions to
future results, and future consequences to present
conditions.
To be intelligent we must f stop, look, listen'
in making the plan of an activity.
To identify acting with an aim and intelligent
activity is enough to show its value--its function
in experience.
1 John Dewey, Democracy and Education
, p. 117.
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To be conscious is to be aware of what we are about;
conscious signifies the deliberate, observant planning
traits of activity. ... to have an aim is to act with
meaning, ... it is to mean to do something and to per-
ceive the meaning of things in the light of that
int ent .
2
He establishes the criteria of good aims as follows:
(1) The aim set up must be an outgrowth of existing
conditions. It must be based upon a consideration of
what is already going on; upon the resources and diffi-
culties of the situation. Theories about the proper
end of our activities—educational and moral theories
—
often violate this principle. They assume ends lying
outside our activities; ends foreign to the concrete
makeup of the situation; ends which issue from an out-
side source. ... such aims limit intelligence; they
are not the expression of mind in foresight, observa-
tion, and choice of the better among alternative
possibilities. They limit intelligence because, given
ready-made, they must be imposed by some authority
external to intelligence, leaving to the latter nothing
but a mechanical choice of means.
(2) The aim as it first emerges is a mere tenta-
tive sketch. The act of striving to realize it tests
its worth. ... An aim must ... be flexible. The value
of a legitimfte aim ... lies in the fact that we can
use it to change conditions. ... The aim, in short,
is experimental, and hence constantly growing as it
is tested in action.
(3) The aim must always represent a freeing of
activities. The term end in view is suggestive. ...
The only way in which we can define an activity is by
putting before ourselves the objects in which it
terminates ... • But we must remember that the ob.ject
is only a mark or sign by which the mind specifies the
activity one desires to carry out. ... The different
2 Ibid.
, pp. 117-121.
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objects which are thought of are means of directing
the activity. ... The doing with the thing, not the
thing in isolation, is his end. The object is but a
phase of the active end, — continuing the activity-
suecessfully. ... In contrast, ... stands the static
character of an end which is imposed from without the
activity. It is always conceived of as fixed; it is
something to be attained and possessed. ... activity
is a mere unavoidable means to something else; ... it
is a necessary evil; ... the external idee of the aim
leads to a separation of means from end, while an end
which grows up in an activity ... is always both ends
and means ... . Every means is a temporary end until
we have attained it. Every end becomes a means of
carrying activity further as soon as it is achieved.
TCe call it end when it marks off the future directions
of the activity ... means when it marks present
direction. Every divorce of end from means diminishes
by that much the significance of the activity... •
The aim is as definitely a means of action as is any
other portion of an activity.^
In order to have no misgivings about what Professor
Dewey means by an end the following are quoted from two
other sources.
Ends are foreseen consequences which arise in the
course of an activity, and are employed to give added
meaning and to direct its course.*
Ends must be formed in the light of available means.
It may even be asserted that ends are only means
brought into full interaction and integration. The
other side of the truth is that means are fractional
parts of the ends.^
3 Ibid.
. pp. 121-124.
4 John Dewey, Human Mature and C onduc
t
(New York:
Henry Holt Company, 1922 p. 225.
5 John Dewey, The Sources of a Science of Educat ion
(New York: Horace liver ight Company, 1929 ) , p. 59.
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Dr. Dewey applies aims es he has conceived them to
education, stressing the fact that there is nothing peculiar
about educational aims. He compares the educator to a
farmer attempting to show the similarity of the idea of
aim. Conditions are to be dealt with, foresight of possible
consequences to be kept in mind and observed. A certain
order is to be followed by both for the accomplishment of
purpose. In this process any aim is of value which assists
observation, choice and planning. What interferes with the
individual's common sense is harmful. He insists education,
as such, has no aims. What appear to be aims are but
suggestions as to how to observe, look ahead and choose.
With these qualifications in mind, he says:
(l) An educational aim must be founded upon the ...
intrinsic activities and needs ... of the given individ-
ual to be educated. The larger range of perception of
the adult is of great value in observing the abilities
and weaknesses of the young, in deciding what they
amount to. ... But it is one thing to use adult
accomplishments as a context in which to place end
survey the doings of childhood and youth; ... quite
another to set them up as a fixed aim ... •
(2) An aim must be capable of translation into a
method of cooperating with the activities of those
undergoing instruction. It must suggest the kind of
environment needed to liberate and to organize their
capacities. ... It operates to exclude recognition
of everything except what squares up with the fixed
end in view. "Every rigid aim just because it is
rigidly given seems to render it unnecessary to give
careful attention to concrete conditions. ... The
vice of externally imposed ends has deep roots. ...
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the intelligence of the teacher is not free ... (the
pupils) pre constantly confused by the conflicts be-
tween the aims which are natural to their own
experience ... and those in which they are tsught to
acquiesce.
(3) Educators have to be on their guard against
ends that are alleged to be general and ultimate. ...
That education is literally and all the time its own
reward means that no alleged study or discipline is
educative unless it is worth while in its own immediate
learning. ... In education, the currency of these
externally imposed aims is responsible for the
emphasis put upon the notion of preparation for a
remote future and for rendering the work of both
teacher and pupil mechanical and slavish."
In the foregoing Dewey points out the "futility of
trying to establish the aim of education — some one final
aim which subordinates all others to itself. In his
work, "Education and Democracy," he treats the aims of
education as a necessity of life, a soeial function and
process, a growth which "gives individuals s personal
interest in social relationships and control, and the
habits of mind which secure social changes without intro-
ducing disorder."** In this he predicates general or com-
prehensive aims for surveying the specific problems of
education. The purpose is to increase social efficiency
through a cultivation of the power to join freely and
6 John Dewey, Democracy and Education
. pp« 124-129.
7 Ibid. , p. 130.
8 Ibid. , p. 115.
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fully in shared or common activities and through a develop-
ment of culture obtain a broader point of view constantly
expanding in the range and accuracy of one's perception of
meaning.
^
Contradictory and opposed to this idea of the end
or aim of education is that of the scholastics.
The subject of education is man. The first question
logically to follow, therefore, is, "What is man?" All
will agree that man is an animal. "But what kind of animal?"
Deweyites will answer descriptively, "All that makes man
distinct from the lower animals is to be found in culture. "10
The scholastics answer that man is not merely en animal by
nature but is distinguished from all other animals by
rationality. They admit man is an animal of culture, capable
of social development and growth, an historical animal
benefiting with each generation from the progress of former
generations, with a multiplicity of ethico-historioal
patterns of life. Quite reasonably, however, they ask,
"Why is it man hps this faculty of culture?" "Why is it
man has it and lower animals lack it?" The natures must be
different in capacity. They ask again, "And if different—
9 Cf. Ibid.
, pp. 144-145.
10 George E. /xtelle, "John Dewey and the Concept of
Democracy." Educational Trends
. p. 9.
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Why? "Who or what established this difference?" These
questions ere just es logical as those which the scientist
applies to the daily phenomena of experience, ^hey are
just as practical as the questions scientists seek to
answer in surveys of methodology or inductive relationships
in experimental observations of externel ects. ,j-'hey are
far more important to man, as man, because they are funda-
mental. "Who am I?" "Why am I living?" "Whence did I
come?" "Where am I going?" Every business of life takes
an recount of its stock. Every field of knowledge worthy
of the name will not take anything for granted, but must
apply adequate criteria to all action, if it seeks to learn
the Truth .
Man cannot disregard ends any more than he can dis-
regard the very existence of his own life. Having that
something celled being or life, man has it from some other
source than himself, since he is fully aware he did not
make himself and has life for some purpose. Reasonably,
no one can point to any other existence which does not
have a cause and a purpose. Why should man be exempt from
this universal principle? Granting logically that man has
a purpose, the next logical question is "What is it?"
This is called by scholastics the end of man. Man has an
answer for the end of everything else that comes into his
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experience and presents itself to his observation. He
cannot exempt himself from reflection upon his own end.
Ends, therefore, cannot be disregarded.
The answer to the question of man's end is found
by scholastics in inquiring, as he asks of everything else
exterior to him, "What is its nature?"
Man, according to scholastics, is a rational animal.
He hps an animal nature, material in all animalistic
capacities. He has, in addition, rationality. He is
rational because of superior faculties which the animal
lacks. He hes intelligence and free will. He has a
spiritualistic principle different from that of animals
which differentiates man into ? definite species of the
genus animal. This is demonstrated by the acts of men dis-
cernible to other men and which can be definitely categorized
by scientific criteria applied to them.
Men has intelligence because he can think, solve
problems, and rdjust himself to man pnd varied circumstances
of life. He can reason from the previous experiences of
others, es well es his own past experiences, and at least,
avoid mistakes. He is not confined by instinct to one narrow
mode of life, unchanging and unchanged. He finds himself
dependent upon others and recognizes the sociality of his
nrture. He reflects upon his individuality, distinct from

all others, and compares his individuality with that of
others observing the individual differences. He sees him-
self a creature in a vast web of forces and influences,
cosmic, ethnic, historic, whose laws are to be followed.
He is forced even by observation to predicate of himself
a nobler existence than the lower world around him which
he uses for his own benefit and thereby demonstrates that
he holds himself higher than the material which he uses as
a servant. The nobler element is further demonstrated in
reflecting that he possesses the power to compass in
thought the universe about him, its relationships and
proportions and has the power to evaluate the species and
genus. This is knowledge rooted in intelligence.^-^ He
is conscious of the memory of the past, bitter as well as
sweet, joyful as well as griefful. He is conscious of the
power to create, as it were, through the faculty of
imagination with reason. He acknowledges the myriads of
inventions given to the world through the use of these
very faculties. He recognizes that this is more than an
individuation of matter and higher than the accomplishments
of the material. It is the comprehension of the past and
the vision of the future contained in a faculty of the
11 Cf . Jacques Maritain, Education at the Crossroads
(New Haven: Yale University i^ress, 1943;, p. 9.

present, in which the past end future can exist simultaneously,
thereby demonstrating that it is beyond and above the ex-
tension of the material. This is the spiritual essence of
man which differentiates the matter in which it is extended,
i.e., personality end the rational soul.
Scholastics hold that this specific neture is not
purposeless, but having been caused as it is end so demon-
strated in effect, is destined for an end. This end is
objective, beyond men himself, for if the end of man were
himself, each would seek himself before and above every
other being. If we consider that other men are also beings
of the same species, who would likewise be thus egocentric,
the living of the individual life would be impossible be-
cause of chaos and strife.
The scholastics hold that, the end of man, therefore,
is objective to man himself. It is not to be identified
with means which man uses in the projection of his life.
Han's faculties are subjective, but man's end is objective,
beyond himself.
The social life of man is considered by scholastics
as a proximrte end of man definitely aiding and abetting
the atteinment of the ultimate end of the neture of man.
For es man by his very nsture appreciates the necessity of
dependence upon others, the more agreeable the relationship

79
of thet dependence through reoiprocal duties and rights, the
easier will it be to seek, strive for and attain the ultimate
end of this rational being. This social life is not the
lest or ultimate end of life becsuse it is finite. It is
finite for men himself, because no matter how agreeable may
be his life rnd his associations, one dey he will be forced
to quit them in the finis of death. Ho matter how much he
has contributed to the fullness of the community life and
the growing perfection of a civic community, he must leave
more work or contribution uncompleted which will not satisfy
his nature in this world for the attainment of perfection.
Society objectively and man's place in that society sub-
jectively cannot be the ultimate end of the intellect of
man, seeking always higher truths nor of the will by nature
striving for greater good. Such a termination will be
dissatisfactory because it is incomplete, and men's nature
is not so constructed as to be content with disset isfact ion
as that nFture seeks fulfilment.
Scholastics hold that "immanent 11 ectivities of the
individual, perfecting the subject which exerts them,
exhibit not merely an unfolding of potent ielit ies without
an object to be grasped, not mere movement for the sake of
movement, which would be r circle running and without a
goal, but an intellectual activity, which tends by its
very nature toward an object. Truth is the object which

the intellect seeks. Naturally, the full intellect is not
content till it comprehends all truth, ^his realm of truth
to the scholastic is not compassed by finiteness but by a
wholeness which is ever progressing in attainment and in
progressive significant realization. Goodness is the object
of the will and its progressive possession enhances the full
life of the rational being, '^'his object cannot be attained
in finite life, because all truth which is limitless cannot
be obtained in a limited area and all good cannot be
possessed in a limited life which delimits possession in
proportion to length of mortal life.
To the scholastic, then, the ultimate end of the
rational animal with the capacities he possesses and demon-
strates in the living of mortal life is beyond and above
the limited scope of earthly existence. It is the Infinite
God, the Everlasting "End in which rational existence finds
its cause and its purpose.
The aims of scholastic education are founded upon
this end for which man was made. They are determined by
the rational faculties of man and by revelation through
which man obtains that knowledge which is above the com-
prehension of his natural faculties. The aims of scholastic
education, therefore, will be purposeful, ^hey are known
through the end and will be focused upon that end, using

every existent means for attainment.
B. The Precise Meaning attached to, Va lues by each
System .
A second basis of comparison is now offered, flowing
naturally from the first and as vital to the philosophic
structure of the two schools and their theories of education
as the foundation is to the house. It is a consideration
of absolute and relative values. In reference to education,
it is a determination as to whether or not there are ab-
solute and universal principles on which education should
be founded.
In order to obtain the correct doctrine of John Dewey
on the subject his own words are given in explanation.
It concerns ... ultimate values. I have carried on
a polemic against ultimates and finalities because I
have found them presented as things that are inherently
absolute, like ' ends- in-themselves 1 instead of ends in
relationships. The reason they have been proffered as
absolutes, is that they have been taken out of any and
all temp oral context. A thing may be ultimate in the
sense of coming last in a given temporal series, so
that it is ultimate for that series. There are things
that come last in reflective valuations and, as terminal,
they are ultimate. ... for me the metiiod of intelligent
action is precisely such an ultimate value. It is the
last, the final or closing, things which we come upon
in inquiry into inquiry. But the place it occupies in
the temporal manifestation of inquiry is what makes it
such a value, not some property it possesses in and of
itself, in the isolation of non-relatedness . It is
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ultimate in use and function; it does net claim to be
ultimate because of an absolute 'inherent nature' making
it sacrosanct, a transcendant object of worship.
^
Gordon Allport, in evaluating the philosophy of John
Dewey in his article in the first volume of the Library of
Living Philosophers , comments further on this theory of
Dewey:
If democracy is, as he (Dewey) believes, the most
advanced way of community living, it must be continually
born anew in every generation, for man's original nature
by no means leads to the spontaneous exercise of the
powers of inquiry and self-reorganization that is de-
manded by democratic life. A set of cheap and easy
absolutes may satisfy adherents of a Totalitarian state
but not of democracy. The authentic democrat takes
fright at the appearance of rigid formulations set for
an educational policy that keeps the mind limber, and
enables it to participate in its own destiny.
Especially objectionable are those psychological theories
that set limits to the capacity of human beings for
self- improvement . ...
A properly formulated psychology will inevitably work
hand in hand with the instrumental ideal of education.
True psychology is itself 'a conception of democracy',
for it believes in the efficacy of training, of
communication, participation and action, as ways of
changing human conduct. It does. not deal with absolutes.
Rather, it proceeds step by step, asking what the organism
is going to do next. Ana it marches hand in hand with
the ethics of instrumentalism asking what it is better
to do next.
12 John Dewey, "Experience, Knowledge and Value," The
Philosophy of John Dewey
.
The Library of Living Philosophers,
Series, 1939, I, 594.
13 Gordon W. Allport, Ibid.
, pp. 280-281
V
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John H. Randall, Jr., explaining Dewey's theories in
the same volume, writes:
We have thoroughly learned that ideas are relative
to s context, end that neither history nor science re-
veals any fixed absolutes.14
The cardinal philosophic sin hes been to shrink from
practical action to take refuge in en unshakable higher
realm of fixed and antecedent Reality. Afraid to seek
a shifting and relative security by the effort? of
intelligence, men have found consolation in the exalta-
tion of pure intellect and the eternal intelligible
perfection it has beheld. This cowardly choice, to
ecoept a world understood instead of trying to change
it, Dewey connects, by a somewhat dubious logic, with
the quest for an absolute and immutable certainty in
the things of the mind. Whatever has appeared in pest
thought of such a craven yearning for the eternal and
unchanging must be dissolved forever in the relativities
of time. For complete fixity or absolute certainty
there can be no place.
^
Dewey writing of the philosophy of education gives
further light on what he feels is the origin of the principle
of the absolute:
A remote goal of complete unfoldedness is, in
technical philosophic language, transcendental. That
is, it is something apart from direct experience and
perception. So far as the experience is concerned, it
is empty; it represents a vague sentimental aspiration
rether than anything which can be intelligently grasped
or stated. This vagueness must be compensated for by
some a priori formula.
14 John R. Rendall, Jr., Ibid. , p. 100
15 Ibid. , p. 98.
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To regard known things as symbols according to some
arbitrary a priori formula- -and every a priori con-
ception must be arbitrary-- is an invitation to romantic
fancy to seize upon any, analogies , which appeal to it
and treat them as laws.
Finally, Dr. Schilpp, an ardent follower of Mr.
Dewey, sums up the denial of the Absolute as follows:
Of course, the principles of education are 'relative'
not absolute. They are relative to space and time, to
human interests and needs, to culture-patterns and
temporary motivations; they are relative to human nature
and its capacities, to the desire for happiness and to
whatever is to be taken to be 'good' and 'better'.
They are relative to changing modes of human thought,
knowledge, and conduct. And so on ad infinitum .
. .
. whatever education viewed from a relativistic
standpoint may seem to lose, it is able more than to
maite up on the side of its being in harmony with the
democratic view of life. Absolutistic principles of
education are the best training ground for fascism
and totalitarianism of any and every kind. ...
Whereas democracy always leaves room for experimentation,
which is, in the long run, the best guarantee that the
possibilities for improvement shall not be cut off.
Moreover, though relativistic education may be pre-
carious, it is no more so than is life itself. It is,
after all, the very precariousness of human life which
accounts for its adventurous, its heroic, and its
creative character. It is precisely because we do not
know--in detail—where we are n-oine- , that the turn
around each new corner presents us with new and un-
dreamed-of vistas, with unexpected beauty, and with
the challenge to new darinp and adventure. The
16 John Dewey, Democracy and Education , pp. 68.
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relative character of educational principles opens up
this same sort of opportunity for adventure and for
novelty. 17
In order to understand the relativistic principles
of experimental ism and the educational philosophy which
flows therefrom, as expressed by Dewey and his followers,
the following me in tenets of this school are set forth
before progressing to a consideration of the principles
of scholasticism*
(1) Han is continuous with nature and lives in a
world of constant change. Since no final view of
reality is needed or possible, there are no absolute
values or standards of judgment.
(2) There is no reality beyond that knowable
through human experience.
(3) Man, by the intelligent reconstruction of
experiences, can remake the world to meet his needs
and desires. Man ... through experience, creates
his own values, his own truth.
(4) Life is an interaction between the individual
and his environment. ... Experience is the sole
means of guiding adjustments to felt needs
«
(5) Man differs in degree but not in kind from
other animals.
(6) Intelligence is but behavior that is stimulated
and guided by anticipated desirable consequences.
17 Paul A. Schilpp, "Are There Absolute and Universal
Principles on Which Education Should Be Founded?" Educational
Trends , (school of Education, Northwestern University, July-
August, 1941) p. 24.
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(7) Education is a continuous reconstruct ion of
experiences wherein the individual is the end and
society the means.
(8) Democracy is an ' inclusive way of life 1 re-
quiring a continual 'reconstruction of beliefs and
standards'
The child becomes an end in himself to the followers
of this particular program. He develops from within and
gives outward expression to his inherent interests and
capacities by spontaneous activity for achievement. He
makes his own truth by choosing it for himself or by de-
termining, through his own experience, what he will accept
rs truth. The child is free from dependence on others in
this form of education which is a continuous reconstruction
of experience. The child is taught to evaluate human ex-
perience solely by its pragmatic or instrumental value and
that only immediate values are of worth.
This is the philosophy of John Dewey which has been
put into practise in his system of education.
Scholastic philosophers hold on the contrary that
there are basic absolute and universal principles governing
man's life and the educative process. The a posteriori
method may first be used to establish the proof. The first
basic proposition is thft human nature is everywhere and in
18 Redden and Ryan, lb id
.
. p. 477.
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all times the same. The nature of human offspring is to
produce its kind. The resultant human nature has po-
tentialities or capacities for growth and development
which are similar. Specific human nature is everywhere
the same.
The education applied to that human nature is a
process whereby man helps himself or others to become what
he can be. Change alone, however, is not enough, for it
can be for the worse as well as better. The change must
be for the better as everyone everywhere understands edu-
cation as a process of improvement, else it would not be
good for men. This improvement for the good of man is
conducive to a good life, enriched by the possession of
the good of every kind. This possession of good satisfies
the innate desire for happiness founded in the will whose
object is good. Thus men, everywhere the same, possessing
the same nature seeking similar ends, posit a universal
principle as an absolute end—the attainment of happiness.^
Arguing in the a posteriori method, as hss heretofore
been described, scholastics acknowledge the effects known to
them n nd to all normal men through the evidence of visible
19 Of. Mortimer J. Adler, "Are there absolute and universal
principles on which education should be founded?" Educational
Trends (northwestern University, July-August, 1941), pp. 14-16.
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observable creation. He recognizes these did not make them-
selves but were made by another since "nemo dat quod non
habet." He queries then to the cause of the effects pro-
duced* In this Maker, man finds the cause which created
him with a purpose. In himself man finds his nature created
as it is with an end. In this relation he is cognizant of
an obligation by his creation to a creator and finds therein
the reason of his being. He cannot escape his beginning nor
remove from his end without destroying the natural relation
of his creation. This is an absolute in man^ life. This
universal obligation of creature to Creator is the principle
which determines largely the contents and methods of
scholastic education,
A priori the scholastics give the metaphysical proof
of an uncaused cause as a proof of the existence of the Maker
of the universe. The teleological argument proves that a
supremely intelligent Being rules the universe. The universe
and its contents are subjects to la?/s of their own nature
in the fulfilment of the design and order of the provident
Huler and Conserver of creation. Man is one of the contents
of this directed creation. Man is no exception to the
universal lew, ssve in the freedom of his individual choice.
The abuse of this freedom is repugnant to the universal law,
called in regard to man, the moral law, and in respect to

89
its Pounder, God's law. Repugnance to the law precludes
the fulfilment of man's created nature. The men is subject
to the law which produced him and his end and prescribes
to thet end. Educrtion is the means of direction of this
prescription. Therefore, man's education should be as
absolute and universal as the law governing the nature of
man with purpose, destiny and ultimate end.
Scholastic philosophy makes use of every method of
science in its quest for certainty and for the answer to
the fundamental questions of life. With science it seeks
explanation of separate frets and their relation to one
another. It is founded upon sense knowledge. It seeks
verification of realities by comparison and contrast of
objective externals in relation one to another. It uses
a natural possession, higher than the senses which pre able
only to transmit through perception the forms of external
matter. This natural possession conceives in a spiritual
mode the stimulus of the senses end reproduces them in an
abstraction. This endowment is the active intellect which
is part of the nature of men.
Scholastics hold that this faculty mey still act
though one sense or all senses, having once acted, mey be
inactive. For example, a man stricken blind after forty
years of life, still may conjure an imagination or image
of e house, church or man's face. In other words sense
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knowledge, while the foundation of knowledge, is not the
only knowledge. Scholastics teach that the mind of man may
use this sense knowledge and the concomitant ideas produced
to form judgments of agreement or disagreement end reason
from facts of sensible phenomena to a principle. The in-
tellect, the memory, the imagine t ion ere powers inherited
by natural men as well as the senses. Their productions,
provided the mind is normal, are as worthy of trust as are
the normal senses. The predication of knowledge upon sense
reproduction alone to the exclusion of other normal posses-
sions of human nature is to deprecate complete human nature.
These natural faculties, scholastics teach, may be
used as in science to seek explanation of facts, their re-
let ionships, and the common elements inherent in any
definite similarity of sction. By incomplete induction
one may abstract to a principle of law seen to be common.
Th is is the experimental feature of the possessions of human
nature. But man has a power of reflection inherent in him
alone. This faculty added to the power of abstraction en-
ables him in reason to pass beyond the realm of experimenta-
tion to first principles or the ultimate meaning of the
realities known through sense knowledge. This may be de-
fined as "the methodical investigation of the whole of
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reality through its ultimate causes. "20
Scholastics teach that there is a dynamic force
immanent in man urging him to truth, This urge is dis-
satisfied unless the truth be recognized in its basic form.
This power is a possession not of one, or of a few, but of
all normal men.
Man in his human nature is aware of another dynamic
power, freedom of action in the conflict of choices. The
nature of man, as he is man, seeks fulfilment of his powers.
The use of this freedom is one of these powers. Since it
exists, it must have a purpose and an object; else the power
would be inane. Its peculiar and proper use is to choose
what it deems better for itself in a conflict of choices.
This is called its proper object and is named good. The
will does not act alone for then it is not will, but impulse.
It is part of the whole man and the faculties to be correct
in use are determined by the end of the whole man. The will
must be controlled as part of the whole man else it is arbi-
trary, end an arbitrary judge cannot be trusted to secure
the good of the other possessions of the same nature. If
it must be controlled, as the whole nature so dictates, it
must go beyond its moral sense in choice to a governing
20 Hedden and Hyan, p. 14.
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guide which is the reason. Reason is the test of certitude
and the determiner of good for the whole man. Thus scholastic
philosophy recognizes the urge of men for ultimate truth and
complete happiness.
Scholastic philosophy finds in all men the same urges.
It adds up the actuation of these urges to ascertain the
common elements in all men. It accepts these common factors
of human experience, peculiar to eech and common to all, and
upon these predicates a philosophy of life. 2?hese common
factors ere universal, and if universal, determine a common
end of the nature in which they are existent. Being common
and universal they are reasoned as principles of life to be
followed in reaching the destiny of the created human nature.
It is the application of this principle to the education of
a common nature for a common end that is celled an absolute
of scholastic educational philosophy.
The deductions of the natural theology of the scho-
lastics demonstrate the existence of a Supreme Being. The
argument from motion to a First Moving Power, the argument
from effects to a First Oeuse Uncaused, the argument from
contingency to a Necessary Being, the argument from
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gradation of perfection to a criterion, the supremely Perfect
Being, are demonstrations of reason to this Existence.
The moral arguments of man's desire for happiness,
man's sense of moral obligation and the universal consent
of man add force to the conclusion of reason. This answer
of reason to the questions, "Who am I, What am I and 'Thence
do I go?" is of prime importance to human beings. This
answer is the foundation of the principles of life. The
existence of this First Cause, Prime Mover, Necessary and
Perfect i>eing is a fundamental factor in the life of the
caused, moved, contingent human nature superior to animal
life. This Being is unchangeable as there can be nothing
beyond a First Cruse or Prime Mover, nothing greater than
the necessary, nothing more perfect than perfection. It
is an absolute and is man's beginning and end--henee
cannot be ignored as an absolute principle in education.
This principle is recognized in the practice of religion.
Added to this in the scholastic educational phil-
osophy is the concept of revelation which is in no way
repugnant to reason, as it is simply the direct communication
to ttp.o. of truths he could not otherwise know, because they

are beyond his finite faculties. They ere not repugnant
to reason for they contradict it in no way. They are
contributory to reason for they explain what reason itself
oannot conjure.
The completion of revelation was in Christ, Who
is considered by scholasticism to be what He said He was,
God. His teachings, not contradictory to reason, be-
come the supernatural foundation of the system already
expounded in the natural light of reason. They are
taught in the Christian Religion.
Deeds are done or omitted by Christians following
Christ, as God, w^"th motives which He inspired, for re-
wards that He promises. The culmination of the natural
life, which will be well nigh perfect if His teachings
are practised, will be found in the supernatural life
to follow the completion of natural existence. This is
an absolute principle based on the word of God, Creator
and Redeemer of man. If the creature and redeemed mean
anything, therefore, the principles of Christ, as &od,
unchangeable and unchanged should be absolute in the
process of education.
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C. Naturalism and Supernaturalism.
The next "basis of comparison which flows logically
from the last consideration is the plane upon which the
educational standards are to be placed. Two elements are
to be found in human life, a natural and a supernatural.
Each, if they exist, will have standards or norms pro-
portionate to their efficacy. As in the two previous con-
siderations, the two schools are found almost diametrically
opposed on this subject.
First, the school of experimental ism or instrumen-
talism represented by Dewey insists that only a natural
standard is to be applied as only nature or the natural can
be accepted as known through sense knowledge. Mr. Dewey
writes
:
Educational reformers disgusted with the convention-
ality and artificiality of the scholastic methods they
find about them are prone to resort to nature as a
standard to furnish the law and the end of development;
ours it is to follow and conform to her ways. The
positive value of this conception lies in the force-
ful way in which it calls attention to the wrongness of
aims which do not have regard to the natural endowment
of those educated. Its weakness is the ease with which
natural in the sense of normal is confused with the
physical. The constructive use of intelligence in
foresight, and contriving, is then discounted; we are
just to get out of the way and allow nature to do the
work. Since no one has stated in the doctrine both its
truth and falsity better than Rousseau, we shall turn
to him.
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'Education*, he says, 'we receive from three sources-
nature, men, and things. The spontaneous development of
our organs and capacities constitutes the education of
nature. The use to which we are taught to put this de-
velopment constitutes that education given us by men.
The acquirement of personal experience from surrounding
objects constitutes that of things. Only when these
three kinds of education are consonant and make for the
same end, does a man tend toward his true goal, ,,, If
we are asked what is this end, the answer is that of
nature. For since the concurrence of the three kinds
of education is necessary to their completeness, the
kind which is entirely independent of our control must
• necessarily regulate us in determining the other two,'
Then he defines nature to mean the capacities and dis-
positions which are inborn, 'as they exist prior to the
mortification due to constraining habits and the in-
fluence of the opinion of others.' 2!
After differentiating the elements of falsity from
those of truth contained in Rousseau, Dewey continues his
treatment of natural development as he sees it. The fol-
lowing is a summation of his views of the aims of eduoation
which are to be found dictated in nature.
Natural development as an aim fixes attention upon
the bodily organs and the need of health and vigor, •••
The aim of natural development translates into the aim
of respect for physical mobility. ••• The general aim
translates into the aim of. regard for individual dif-
ferences among children.
Lastly, the aim of following nature means to note
the origin, the waxing, and waning, of preferences and
interests, , ,, natural tendencies ••• show themselves
most readily in a child's spontaneous sayings and do-
ings ••• • It does not follow that these tendencies
John Dewey, Democracy and Education, pp. 131-132.
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are all desirable because they are natural; but it does
follow that since they are there, men are operative and
must be taken account of. We must see to it that the
desirable ones have an environment which keeps them ac-
tive, and that their activity shall control the direc-
tion the others take and thereby induce the disuse of
the latter because they lead to nothing. 22
... the doctrine of the educative accord with nature
has been reenforced by the development of modern biol-
ogy* physiology, and psychology. ... great as is the
significance of nurture, of modification, and trans-
formation through direct educational effort, nature, or
unlearned capacities, affords the foundation and ulti-
mate resources for such nurture.
The business of education is to supply precisely
what nature fails to secure; namely, habituation of an
individual to social control; subordination of natural
powers to social rules. ... Translated into specific
aims, social efficiency indicates the importance of in-
dustrial competency. Persons cannot live without means
of subsistence; ... . There is, however, grave danger
that in insisting upon this end, existing economic con-
ditions and standards will be accepted as final. A
democratic criterion requires us to develop capacity to
the point of competency to choose and make its own
career. This principle is violated when the attempt is
made to fit individuals in advance for definite indus-
trial callings, selected not on the basis of trained
original capacities, but on that of the wealth or so-
cial status of parents.
It is, of course, arbitrary to separate industrial
competency from capacity in good citizenship. But the
latter term may be used to indicate a number of quali-
fications which are vaguer than vocational ability.
Ibid., pp. 134-136.
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These traits run from whatever make an individual a more
agreeable companion to citizenship in the political
sense: it denotes ability to judge men and measures
wisely and to make a determining part in making as well
as obeying laws. The aims of civic efficiency have at
least the merit of protecting us from the notion of a
training of mental power at large.
In the broadest sense, social efficiency is nothing
less than that socialization of mind which is actively
concerned in making experiences more communicable ; in
breaking down the barriers of social stratification
which make individuals impervious to the interests of
others: ... Social efficiency, even social service, are
hard and metallic things when severed from an active
acknowledgment of the diversity of goods which life may
afford to different persons, and from faith in social
utility of encouraging every individual to make his own
choice intelligent.
Whether or not social efficiency is an aim which is
consistent with culture turns upon these considerations.
Culture means at least something cultivated, something
ripened; ... When efficiency is identified with a nar-
row range of acts instead of with the spirit and meaning
°f activi ty culture is opposed to efficiency.
But if democracy has a moral and ideal meaning, it is
that a social return be demanded from all and that op-
portunity for development of distinctive capacities be
afforded all.
The aim of efficiency (like any educational aim) must
be included within the process of experience. ... Any
individual has missed his calling ... who does not find
that the accomplishment of results of value to others
is an accompaniment of a process of experience inherent-
ly worth while.
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There is no greater tragedy than that so much of the
professed spiritual and religious thought of the world
has emphasized the two ideals of self-sacrifice and
spiritual self-perfecting instead of throwing its
weight against this dualism of life, ••• it is the par-
ticular task of education at the present time to strug-
gle in behalf of an aim in which social efficiency and
personal culture are synonyms instead of antagonists. 23
Referring to the apparent irreligion in the world to-
day, Dewey gives an insight into his religious tenets on a
merely natural "basis.
And we are still, even those who have nominally sur-
rendered supernatural dogma, largely under the dominion
of the ideas of those who have succeeded in identifying
religion with the rites, symbols, and emotions associ-
ated with these dogmatic beliefs. As we see the latter
disappearing, we think we are growing irreligious. For
all we know, the integrity of mind which is loosening
the hold of these things is potentially more religious
than all that it is displacing. It is increased knowl-
edge of nature which has made supra-nature incredible,
or at least difficult of belief. We measure the change
from the standpoint of the supernatural and we call it
irreligious. Possibly if we measured it from the stand-
point of the natural piety it is fostering, the sense
of the permanent and inevitable implication of nature and
man in a common career and destiny, it would appear as a
growth in religion. We take note of the decay of cohe-
sion and influence among the religiously organized bodies
of the familiar historic type, and again we convention-
ally judge religion to be on the decrease. But it may
be that their decadence is the fruit of a broader and
more catholic principle of human intercourse and asso-
ciation which is too religious to tolerate these pre-
tensions to monopolize truth and to make private pos-
sessions of spiritual insight and aspiration.
Ibid
., pp. 137-145
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So far as education is concerned, those who believe
in religion as a natural expression of human experience
must devote themselves to the development of ideas of
life which lie implicit in our still new science and
our still nev/er democracy. They must interest them-
selves in the transforation of those institutions
which still bear the dogmatic and the feudal stamp (and
which do not?) till they are in accord with these ideas.
In performing this service, it is their business to do
what they can to prevent all public educational agen-
cies from being employed in ways which inevitably im-
pede the recognition of the spiritual import of science
and democracy, and hence of that type of religion which
will be the flower of the modern spirit 's achievement*
Those who approach religion and education from the
side of unconstrained reflection, not from the side of
tradition, are of necessity aware of the tremendous
transformation of intellectual attitude effected by the
systematic denial of the supernatural; they are aware
of the changes it imports not merely in special dogmas
and rites, but in the interpretation of the world, and
in the projection of social, and hence, moral life.25
Dewey in his indictment of the doctrine of supernat-
uralism "charges that it is incompatible with the method
and the spirit of scientific inquiry and with the relation-
ships aid institutions of democracy." 2 ** saying:
(it) consists in administration of the temporal,
finite and human in its relation to the eternal and
P4
* John Dewey, Educati on Today
, pp. 85-86.
25Ibid., p. 76.
26Edward L. Schaub, "Interpretation of Religion,"
The Philos ophy of John Dewey (Library of Living Philosophers),
p. 407.
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infinite, by means of dogma and cult, rather than in
regulation of the events of life by understanding of
actual conditions. 2 '
... supernaturalism is incompatible with the meth-
od and spirit of scientific inquiry and with the re-
lationships and institutions of democracy; he declares
it philosophically untenable because of its belief in
realities anteceding thought and practise, and its
insistence on treating the ideal as more than the
possibilities discoverable in experience and in some
measure capable of realization through the intelligent
and devoted efforts of human individuals; he insists
that its attempts to inculcate thoroughgoing assurance
and a sense of absolute certainty and security are
alike hostile to the intellectual enterprise and sub-
versive of socially and morally constructed action.
In short, he makes the charge that supernaturalism is
intellectually false and morally vicious, 2®
Norman Woelfel in his discussion of John Dewey's
viewpoint says:
(The) Scientific Method has proved itself the only
reliable means of discovering the realities of exist-
ence: it is the new authentic revelation, inexhaust-
ible in its possibilities but extremely upsetting in
its immediacy. Faith in God and in authority, ideas
of soul and immortality, belief in Divine Grace,
stable institutions, and automatic progress have been
made impossible for the educated mind of today.29
John Dewey, Experience and Nature (New York: W. W#
Norton and Company, 1929 ) , p. 55.
28Ibid., pp. 407-408.
29^Norman Woelfel, Holders of the American Mind (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1953)
, p. 119.
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These quotations state explicitly the thesis of nat-
uralism which marks the philosophical and educational tenets
of Dewey, and brings into the clear their implications for
educational method 0
The scholastic school teaches not only the possibil-
ity of the supernatural and revelation but its actuality,
which presents a formidable direction of educational aims
and methods in regard to the proper teaching and learning
of the human being, composed of body and soul, created for
a destiny higher than the natural.
The fundamentals of this system have already been
explained as based upon the consideration of the whole man,
a rational being having a spiritual principle, the human
soul. The scholastic philosophy of life applied to man
admits all the experiences and elements of a mortal life
but holds that natural life is not the complete content of
the existence of the rational animal, man. It teaches
that a limited mortal life will not suffice for the satis-
faction of the faculties inherent in man, that natural
life is incomplete and that a supernatural life is neces-
sary to fulfil the requirements of the qualifications
found in man.
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Scholasticism maintains, moreover, that the verified
experiments of human nature are not the only knowledge man
may possess. It teaches that this is only part of the
natural knowledge of man and that supernatural knowledge is
also obtainable by man through the medium of God^ revela-
tion*
Scholasticism is divided into two distinct branches,
natural philosophy and supernatural philosophy, or theology.
Each has its distinct sphere, one studying the natural order,
the other, things above nature: yet the natural reason of
man is used in both. In the supernatural sphere, however,
it is abetted by truths of revelation. God is author of
both reason and revelation. God is the author of man. It
is inherently contradictory to maintain that God who speaks
to man in revelation and God who manifests Himself in His
creations can disagree. This would argue against God as
immutable, because it would manifest change. This would
dispute the all-perfection of God for it would admit error
in Him. The supernatural, then, as well as the natural
find themselves as one in the search of truth and the pur-
suit of good.
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Man, the object of the educative process, finds him-
self in a natural and a supernatural world. He has a nat-
ural and supernatural end and means in each order to assist
him in the accomplishment of his purpose and the attainment
of his end. This does not insinuate, however, that there
is conflict, A concomitant agreeable association is thus
enjoyed provided the proper end is sought.
Acknowledging the original defection of man in refus-
ing to co-operate with his Maker and the corresponding de-
preciation of his original powers, scholastics give added
significance to the necessity of supernatural aid for man*
Revelation is our source of the knowledge of ma^s breach
or desertion, known directly by sense perception by our
first progenitors.
In addition to revelation, as before explained,
Christ, the Son of God, has added to our knowledge of the
supernatural end and the means thereto. The facts of this
supernatural manifestation are attested to by the testimony
of history.
Dynamic human nature may be no less dynamic by the
interposition of the supernatural. It may obtain greater
fulfilment of the natural because of superior guidance*
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It may become more active because of the added supernatural
feature of life through co-operating with the supernatural
benefits.
Concluding the comparison of the two schools of
philosophy it seems fitting to quote Pope Leo XIII and Pope
Pius XI who express clearly and directly the scholastic
philosophical principles applied to both the natural and
supernatural in man*
Pope Leo XIII in his Encyclical letter "Eterni Pat-
ris" recommends the study of scholastic philosophy whose
domain is both the natural and the supernatural.
Whoso turns his attention to the bitter strifes of
these days and seeks a reason for the troubles that
vex public and private life, must come to the con-
clusion that a fruitful cause of the evils which now
afflict, as well as those which threaten us, lies in
this: that false conclusions concerning divine and
human things, which originated in the schools of
philosophy, have crept into all the orders of the
State, and have been accepted by the common consent
of the masses. For since it is in the very nature of
man to follow the guide of reason in his actions, if
his intellect sins at all his will soon follows; and
thus it happens that looseness of intellectual opinion
influences human actions and perverts them. Whereas,
on the other hand, if men be of sound mind and take
their stand on true and solid principles, there will
result a vast amount of benefits for the public and
private good. We do not, indeed, attribute such force
and authority to philosophy as to esteem it equal to
the task of combating and rooting out all errors; for,
when the Christian religion was first constituted, it
came upon earth to restore it to its primeval dignity
by the admirable light of faith, diffused not by per-
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suasive words of human wisdom, but in the manifestation
of spirit and of power; so also at the present time we
look above all things to the powerful help of Almighty-
God to bring back to a right understanding the minds of
men and dispel the darkness of error. But the natural
helps with which the grace of the divine wisdom, strong-
ly and sweetly disposing all things, has supplied the
human race are neither to be despised nor neglected,
chief among which is evidently the right use of philo-
sophy. For not in vain did God set the light of reason
in the human mind; and so far is the superadded light
of faith from extinguishing or lessening the power of
the intelligence that it completes it rather, and by
adding to its strength renders it capable of greater
things.
Therefore divine Providence itself requires that in
calling back the peoples to the paths of faith and sal-
vation advantage should be taken of human science also
- an approved and wise practise which history testifies
was observed by the most illustrious Fathers of the
Church. They, indeed, were wont neither to be-little
nor undervalue the part that reason had to play, as is
summed up by the great Augustine when he attributes to
this science 'that by which the most wholesome faith
is begotten, ... is nourished, defended, and made
strong. * 30
Pope Pius XI in his Encyclical letter "Christian
Education of Youth" elaborates lucidly on the place of the
supernatural in the educational process of Christian Educa-
tion, the educational philosophy of Scholasticism.
Indeed never has there been so much discussion about
education as nowadays; never have exponents of new ped-
agogical theories been so numerous, or so many methods
3(
*The Great Encyclical Letters of Pope Leo XIII,"
The Study of Scholastic Philosophy , Trans. (New York:
Benziger Brothers, 1903), pp. 35-36.
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and means devised, proposed and debated, not merely to
facilitate education, but to create a new system in-
fallibly efficacious, and capable of preparing the
present generations for that earthly happiness which
they so ardently desire.
The reason is that men, created by God, to His image
and likeness and destined for Him who is infinite per-
fection, realize today more than ever amid the most
exuberant material progress, the insufficiency of
earthly goods to produce true happiness either for the
individual or for the nations. And hence they feel
more keenly in themselves the impulse towards a per-
fection that is higher, which impulse is implanted in
their national nature by the Creator Himself, This
perfection they seek to acquire by means of education.
But many of them with, it would seem, too great in-
sistence on the etymological meaning of the word, pre-
tend to draw education out of human nature itself and
evolve it by its own unaided powers. Such easily fall
into error, because, instead of fixing their gaze on
God, first principle and last end of the whole universe,
they fall back upon themselves, becoming attached ex-
clusively to passing things of earth; and thus their
restlessness wil}. never cease till they direct their
attention and their efforts to God, the goal of all
perfection, according to the profound saying of St.
Augustine: 'Thou didst create us, 0 Lord, for Thyself,
and our heart is restless till it rest in Thee. 1 33-
In fact it must never be forgotten that the subject
of Christian education is man whole and entire, soul
united to body in unity of nature, with all his facul-
ties natural and supernatural, such as right reason and
revelation show him to be; man, therefore, fallen from
his original estate, but redeemed by Christ and re-
stored to the supernatural condition of adopted son of
Five Great Encyclicals
, p. 38.
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God, though without the preternatural privileges of
bodily immortality or perfect control of appetite.
There remain therefore, in human nature the effects
of original sin, the chief of which are weakness of
will and disorderly inclinations.
^olly is bound up in the heart of a child and
the rod of correction shall drive it away. 1 Dis-
orderly inclinations then must be corrected, good
tendencies encouraged and regulated from tender
childhood, and above all the mind must be enlight-
ened and the will strengthened by supernatural
truth and by the means of grace, without which it
is impossible to control evil impulses, impossible
to attain to the full and complete perfection of
education intended by the Church, which Christ has
endowed so rightly with divine doctrine and with
the Sacraments, the efficacious means of grace. 32
D. The Moral Sanction.
The last comparison to be made between the educa-
tional principles of the two schools is on the basis of
morality. Morality is the keystone in the arch of society
which holds intact the very existence of man in communion
one with another. It is antecedent to ethics and denotes
those concrete activities of which ethics is the science.
It may be defined "as human conduct in so far as it is
freely subordinated to the ideal of what is right and fit-
ting. This ideal governing our free actions is common to
the race." 33
32Ibid
. , p. 54.
33G. H. Joyce, "Moral ity" f Catholic Encyclopedia ,
X., p. 559.
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Of late, keen debate has arisen regarding the rela-
tion of morality to religion. The evolutionary schools
and positivism maintain that right moral action is alto-
gether independent of religion and argue for an independ-
ent morality.
Serious defects in the fabric of society have arisen
in the home and in the state where the sanction afforded
morality through religion has been denied by the rejection
of religion. Much of a nation* s legislation affects moral-
ity for the safeguard of justice, for the assurance of
equitable relations of man, and for the positive pursuance
of virtues through prohibitions of vice under penalties.
A correct evaluation of morality with proper sanction is a
most vital issue to educators. They are responsible to
their individual subjects not only for assisting them to
their last end but for safeguarding their rights to life,
liberty and the pursuit of happiness in the society in
which they find themselves.
The comparison of the teachings of the two schools
concerns an issue therefore which is most vital and none
the less practical.
Experimentalism or instrumentalism as conceived by
Dewey bases its theory of morality on individual experience
and makes the sanction pragmatic.
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They concede no personal, unchanging, eternal God,
nor a God-given code of morality. "God" to Dewey signi-
fies "the unity of all ideal ends arousing us to desire
and actions. "34 Freedom of the will to them is not an
endowment found in nature as placed there by the Creator.
It is an acquirement of man existing in his capacity for
growth and achieved by learning through experience. It
is not a resident faculty inherent in man. Nature pre-
sents to man the possibilities of choice and in these man
finds freedom.
Dewey holds that circumstances arising from experi-
ence and resulting therefrom determine what is good or bad
for the individual and as they adhere in the continuous
growth of experience are subject to continual change. So-
cial approval or disapproval lends them sanction. Accept-
ed usages of society is the nearest approach for them to
an ultimate criterion. Beneficial experience to the indi-
vidual and society in the interrelations of man f s social
and natural environment in the light of practical experi-
ence is their morality.
Dewey maintains that the testing of experience in
various possible courses of action determines the source
*John Dewey. A Common Faith (New Haven: Yale Uni-
versity Press, 1934), p. 42.
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of duty. The greatest good of the greatest number is the
social ideal. In the case of conflict of the individual
with society, it is the duty of the mind as a social in-
strument to remove by intelligent action through adjust-
ment to environment or mortification of behavior whatever
presents itself to frustrate constant growth. There will
be no antagonism for the individual is nurtured by environ-
ment. Complete adjustment is the ideal. Democracy is the
result in which there is continuous reconstruction of ex-
perience and constant change of beliefs and standards. In-
tellectual, social and religious institutions, parts of
this social order, must adjust agreeably themselves.
Excerpts taken from Dewey f s Philosophy explain the
existence and growth of morals as established in his sys-
tem.
Moral theory, for example, is often regarded as an
attempt to find a philosophic ^asis 1 or foundation
for moral activity in something beyond that activity
itself. Now when the question comes up as to the re-
lation of moral theory and moral conduct, the man who
denies any intrinsic connection is without doubt in
possession.
... moral theory ... is all one with moral insight
and moral insight is the recognition of the relation-
ships in hand ... . Moral insight ... consists simply
in the everyday workings of the same ordinary intelli-
gence that measures dry-goods, drives nails ... •
There is no more halo about the insight that deter-
mines what I should do in this catastrophe of life
when the foundations are upheaving and my bent for
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eternity lies waiting to be fixed, than in that which
determines whether commercial conditions favor heavy
or light purchases.
There is nothing more divine or transcendental in re-
solving how to save my degraded neighbor than in the
resolving of a problem in algebra to bap-
tize moral insight with any particular sacredness is
to find a changeling in our hands, - sentimental ism.
The ordinary idea of moral theory shears off the
very factors which make it moral theory at all and
reduces it to the plane of physical theory, ...
Moral theory cannot exist in a book. Moral science
is not a collection of abstract laws. It is only in
the mind of an agent as an agent, ... The breadth
of action ••• is measured by the insight of the agent.
••• Moral rules are ••• tools of analysis.
Morals has to do with all activity into which al-
ternative possibilities enter. Reflection upon action
means uncertainty and consequent need of decision as
to which course is better. The better is good.
The recognition that conduct covers every act that
is judged with reference to better and worse and that
the need of this judgment is potentially co-extensive
with all portions of conduct, saves us from the mis-
take which makes morality a separate department of life.
... Hence, we must decline to admit theories which iden-
tify morals with the purification of motives, edifying
character ... obeying supernatural command, acknowl-
edging the authority of duty. Such notions have a dual
bad effect. First, they get in the way of observation
... . Secondly, while they confer a morbid exaggerated
quality upon things which are viewed under the aspect
of authority, they release the larger part of the acts
of life from serious, that is moral, survey. ... A
moral moratorium prevails for every day affairs.
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The mutual modification of habits by one another en-
ables us to define the nature of the moral situation.
It is not necessary nor advisable to be always consid-
ering the interaction of habits with one another, that
is today the effect of a particular habit upon charac-
ter ... total interaction. Such consideration dis-
tracts attention from the problem of building up an
effective habit. ... To lug in morals, or ulterior
effect upon character at every point, is to cultivate
moral valetudinarianism or priggish posing.
Nevertheless, any act, even that one which passes
ordinarily as trivial, may entail such consequences for
habit and character as upon occasion to require judg-
ment from the standpoint of the whole body of conduct.
It then comes under moral scrutiny. To know when to
leave acts without distinctive moral judgment and when
to subject them to it, is itself a large factor in
morality.
The serious matter is that this relative pragmatic,
or intellectual distinction between the moral and non
moral, has been solidified into a fixed and absolute
distinction, so that some acts are popularly regarded
as forever within and others forever without the moral
domain. From this fatal error, recognition of the re-
lations of one habit to others preserves us. For it
makes us see that character is the name given to the
interaction of habits, ... . 35
Since morals is concerned with conduct, it grows out
of specific empirical facts. Almost all influential
moral theories, with the exception of the utilitarian,
have refused to admit this idea. For Christendom as a
whole, morality has been connected with supernatural
commands, rewards and penalties. Those who have es-
35 John Dewey, The Philosophy of John Dewey , pp. 310-
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caped this superstition have contented themselves
with converting the difference between this world and
the next into a distinction between the actual and the
ideal, what is and what should be. The actual world
has not been surrendered to the devil in name, but it
is treated as a display of physical forces incapable
of governing moral values. Consequently, moral con-
siderations must be introduced from above. Human na-
ture may not be officially declared to be infected be-
cause of some aboriginal sin, but it is said to be
sensuous, impulsive, subjected to necessity, while
natural intelligence is such that it cannot rise above
a reckoning of private expediency.
But in fact morals is the most humane of all subjects.
It is that which is closest to human nature; it is in-
eradicably empirical, not theological, nor metaphysical
nor mathematical. Since it directly concerns human na-
ture, everything that can be known of the human mind and
body in physiology, medicine, anthropology, and psychol-
ogy is pertinent to moral inquiry. Human nature exists
and operates in an environment. ... It is of them,
continuous with their energies, dependent upon their
support, capable of increase only as it utilizes them,
and as it gradually rebuilds from the crude indifference
an environment genially civilized. Hence physics, chem-
istry, history, statistics, engineering science, are a
part of disciplined moral knowledge so far as they en-
able us to understand the conditions and agencies through
which man lives, and on account of which he forms and ex-
ecutes his plans. Moral science is not something with a
separate province. It is physical, biological, and his-
toric knowledge placed in a human context where it will
illuminate and guide the activities of men, ^6
36 Ibid.
, pp. 320-321
Also Cf . Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, pp. 295-
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Dewey further carries on the development of morality
in considering the criteria of valid moral concepts. He
states
:
The ethical judgment is one which effects an abso-
lutely reciprocal determination of the situation
judged, and of the character or disposition which is
expressed in the act of judging. Any particular moral
judgment must necessarily reflect within itself all
the characteristics which are essential to moral judg-
ment uberhaupt. No matter how striking or how unique
the material of any particular ethical experience, it
is at least an ethical experience; and as such its
consideration or interpretation must conform to the
conditions involved in the act of judging. A judgment
which institutes the reciprocal determination just
described has its own characteristic structure or or-
ganization. The work that it has to do gives it
certain limiting or defining elements and properties.
These constitute the ultimate Terms or Categories of
all ethical science. 37
If it be true that a moral judgment is one in which
the content finally affirmed is affected at every
point by the disposition of the judger ... it follows
at once that one portion of the genetic theory neces-
sary for adequate control of individual moral judgments
will consist in an objective analysis of disposition as
affecting action through the medium of judgment.
Psychological analysis is the instrument by which
character is transformed from its absorption in the
values of immediate experience into an objective, sci-
entific fact. It is indeed, a statement of experi-
ence in terms of its modes of control of its own
evolving .38
37 Ibid.
,
p. 332.
Cf . John Dewey, "Logical Conditions of a Scientific
Treatment of Morality," University of Chicago Decennial Pub-
lications
,
(Chicago: University of CnTcago Press
,
1903)
,
First Series, III, pp. 129-130.
38 Ibid., pp. 336-339
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Hence purely psychological propositions are indispen
sable to any concrete moral theory.
The entertaining of ends, the adjudging of values--
such acts are Character—Phenomena. Considered in ab-
straction from their immediate matter in experience,
viz., just as acts, states, or dispositions, they are
character
—
phenomena as these present themselves to
psychological analysis.
Adequate control of an act as determining a content
involves the possibility of making character an object
of scientific analysis of stating it as a system of
related conditions or an object complete in itself —
a universal. ... All scientific judgments, physical
as well as ethical, are ultimately concerned with get-
ting experiences stated in objective (that is, univer-
sal) terms for the sake of direction of further experi-
ence.^^
... reciprocal determination ... requires in its
logical development the conclusion that, since the
judger is personal, the content judged must ultimately
be personal too— so that the moral judgment really in-
stitutes a relationship between persons, relationship
between persons being what we mean by 'social'. ^
Since conscious life is continuous, the possibility
of using any mode of experience to assist in the form-
ation of any other is the ultimate postulate of all
science—non ethical as well as ebhical. And this
possibility of use, of application, of instrumental
service, makes it possible and necessary to employ
materialistic science in the construction of ethical
theory ...
39 Ibid p. 341.
40 Ibid p. 343
41 Ibid p. 345
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In "Democracy and Education" Dewey further explains
the relationship of individual judgment in relation to
others in morality.
Morals are as broad as acts which concern our rela-
tionships with others. And potentially this includes
all our acts, even though their social bearing may not
be thought of at the time of performance. For every
act, by the principle of habit, modifies disposition--
it sets up a certain kind of inclination and desire.
And it is impossible to tell when the habit thus
strengthened may have a direct and perceptible influ-
ence on our association with others. Certain traits
of character have such an obvious connection with our
social relationships that we call them ^oral* ... .
To call these virtues in their isolation is like tak-
ing the skeleton for the living body.
The moral and the social qualities of conduct are,
in the last analysis, identical with each other. 42
In application of this morality on the social basis,
Dewey gives certain rules to follow for the teaching of
moral principles in the school.
(i) In the first place, the school must itself be
a community life in all which that implies.
(ii) The learning in school should be continuous
with that out of school.
Education is not a mere means to such a life (cul-
tural, social). Education is such a life. To main-
42 Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 414-415.
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tain capacity for such education is the essence of mor-
als. For conscious life is a continual beginning afresh.
All education which develops power to share effective-
ly in social life is moral. It forms a character which
not only does the particular deed socially necessary,
but one which is interested in that continual readjust-
ment which is essential to growth. Interest in learning
from all the contacts of life is the essential moral
interest
.
43
George Axtelle in his article in Educational Trends
applies the foregoing principles to the process of Education
and in doing so expresses the doctrine of his teacher, Dewey,
in an accurate description of the value accorded moral prin-
ciples, by the proteges of the school of Instrumentalism.
... since it is impossible to note all the consequences
of an act, we must therefore trust to normal expectations.
It is these normal expectations generalized over genera-
tions of experience that we call moral principles. This
is not to imply that moral principles are to be observed
as fixed dogmas legislating action in a static pattern.
Moral principles like other inductive generalizations
must be treated as hypothetical. Since situations are
unique, since conditions are always changing, moral prin-
ciples must themselves undergo continuous reconstruction.
The very complexity and novelty of situations demand
creative discovery of means appropriate to them. 44
43 Ibid.
, pp. 416-418.
44 George E. Axtelle, "John Dewey and the Concept of
Democracy," p. 13.
i
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Scholasticism has an entirely different concept of
morality, its sanction and its values.
It finds a creation visible to the senses which has
different orders of existence. The proper nature of ob-
jective realities 4s manifested in their properties and
in the external expression of their natures. All are de-
pendent on a cause; all are conserved in their natures in
relation to that cause. The mode of action of each crea-
ture is determined by a natural law in itself. The sanc-
tion of that law is its maker. The bond between man and
the Law Maker is Religion.
Man is a creature in creation with definite powers,
distinct from those obtained by other forms of creation.
One peculiar endowment is a freedom of choice when all
requisites for a free act are present. Man may or may not
act (freedom of contradiction). He can posit a particular
action or its contrary (freedom of contraries). He can
choose a definite action or one specifically different
(freedom of specification)
.
Freedom of contradiction, of which freedom of con-
traries and of specification are species means man is
physically free in his choice. This physical freedom is
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distinguished from moral freedom which is the absence of any
prohibition forbidding a choice.
Scholastics declare that an act is a moral act when
it is physically free and conformable to the eternal law and
right reason. The moral act is good when it conforms with
man 1 s rational nature in all its variety of intrinsic and
extrinsic relations and when it perfects nature and aids in
the attainment of man*s final end. The moral act is bad
when it is not in conformity with right reason, perfective
of his nature, or directive to his supreme end.
Determinants establish the goodness or badness of a
moral act. These determinants are the object of the act
itself and the circumstances surrounding it together with
the intention of the actor. All must be good for a good
act. If one is bad, the act is bad. "Bonum ex integra
causa, malum es quocumque defectu.'14^
An act is morally good when directed by sound reason
toward the attainment of man's ultimate end. Man approach-
es his ultimate end when he strives to attain his immediate
end as a human being. The immediate end is determined by
the proper objects of the natural rational appetites in-
45 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica
,
I, Ilae,
q. 19, a. 6.
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herent in his natural being. The use of a faculty or prop-
erty in such a manner as to frustrate or defeat its natur-
al purpose or end is intrinsically bad because it precludes
the attainment of the ultimate end.
Scholastics hold that duties and obligations are
moral necessities binding the will and through it the whole
man. These are determined by moral laws which bind pur-
posive man to seek the end for which he was made, ultimately
the author of the nature in possession. From the necessity
of nature seeking its end arises the necessity of acts to
reach it, namely, positive acts of conformity and avoidance
of precluding deeds. The sanction of the moral law accord-
ing to reason, therefore, is the attainment of the final
end. Acts contrarywise are forbidden by this sanction be-
cause they are detrimental.
Man who is an individual and a distinct personality
with an end is also social by his nature. For self-develop-
ment and self-realization, without yielding rights, liber-
ties or duties, he unites himself with others in reciprocal
cooperation and fellowship. Scholastics teach that this
sociality implanted in man's nature comes not from himself
but from the Maker of his natural being. The efficient
cause of this mutual inclination in all men is the same
efficient cause of the very society established by men fol-
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lowing this natural inclination. It is the immediate source
of authority for society. Obligations arise from this asso-
ciation in various proportions determining the adjustment of
the individual to the varied circumstances of his surround-
ings .
The scholastic in addition to the reflections and
reasonings of his own natural powers to obtain this natural
conclusion also accepts revelation as a contributing aid to
his reason and recognizes Jesus Christ as a Divine Law giver.
His sanctions are the sanctions of God, Who is the author
of the nature. The laws of Christ are in no way contradic-
tory to the laws of nature. They are complementary in ex-
plaining what man finds difficult to attain by reason alone
and in counseling the proper use of the means found in na-
ture for the attainment of his destiny. They afford in addi-
tion, above and beyond nature, the strongest of sanctions
with eternal penalties.
The sanction of the laws governing man in his life is
predicated on the Maker of that life. That Maker is abso-
lute. He made man for a purpose and an end. This purpose
or end is not man's to make or remake at his will for he
lacks that power. It must be prosecuted accordingly to the
nature made by the Absolute Creator.
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These principles are applied to education by scholast-
ics with a definite end in view. Man is considered in his
whole being, having a body and soul in substantial union.
Adequate means are used to direct man toward the attainment
of complete fruition not only in temporal life, in the en-
lightenment of the intellect, the strengthening of the will,
zhe formation of character, the integration of personality,
reciprocal service in earthly society and in religion, but
also in the ultimate or eternal life. 4^
E . Summary .
The fundamental principles of the educational philoso-
phy of Dewey and scholasticism have been compared in this
chapter
.
While Dewey asserts that ends are only means brought
into full interaction and integration and that it is fu-
tile to establish a final aim of education which subordinates
all others to itself, scholasticism upholds the tenet that
ends are distinct from means, that ends can be objective
realities, that man has an end in the Infinite God and that
the aims of education are to be purposefully formed with the
fundamental idea of this end of man constantly directing
educative means.
46 Cf . Redden and Ryan, pp. 525-530.
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Dewey and his followers deny the possibility of abso-
lute values, claim that everything is of relative value, and
apply the relativistic principles of experimental ism to
education with no final view of reality predicated as need-
ed or possible. Scholastics hold on the contrary that
there are basic and universal principles governing man's
life and the educative process.
Dewey and members of his school deny the supernat-
ural and insist that only a natural standard is to be ap-
plied to life and education as only nature or the natural
can be accepted as known through sense knowledge. Scho-
lasticism teaches not only the possibility of the super-
natural but its actuality, which presents a formidable
direction of educational aims and methods for the prosecu-
tion of man's proper destiny.
The school of John Dewey denies any sanction of
morality above society itself, rejecting a personal eternal
God and a God-given code of morality. Scholasticism teaches
the existence of a God, "Who is the Creator of man and the
Conserver of man's life, Who made man with a purposeful des-
tiny and prescribes the laws to be followed for the attain-
ment of that destiny.
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The succeeding chapter will consider and evaluate the
contradictory principles herein described with the purpose
of calculating, which of the two systems is the better to
follow as the foundation of educative methods.

CHAPTER VI
THE SOUNDER PRINCIPLES OF EDUCATION
In the opening chapter two educational philosophers
stressed the precariousness of the critical times in which
we find ourselves and the necessity of searching reexamina-
tion of our habits and principles. The intervening chapters
have presented a searching examination of the underlying
principles of two great schools of education. A reexamina-
tion of them is presented in this chapter with the purpose
.
of seeking errors in the systems, which may be corrected or
eliminated, of evaluating their principles for the purpose
of determining which is better calculated to answer the
problems of education, remove doubts and uncertainty from
the minds of the educated, and establish a sounder basis on
which to predicate firm, efficacious doctrines which may be
prescribed to meet an incredulous world and give it faith in
itself, a skeptical world and increase its hope, a selfish
world and spread charity.
Wealth has been squandered in the insanity of war.
Despair has spread among helpless people. Agnosticism has
been embraced by men and nations who have learned in sorrow
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that the house of cards they builded with their own hands has
been toppled by their very selves.
In order to determine or establish which system seems
to provide the better principles upon which to predicate a
philosophy of education it will be necessary to deal with the
subject at hand in a negative and positive manner. In the
negative discussion the treatise will endeavor to demonstrate
the weaknesses of the systems. In the positive conclusions
the arguments will be based upon the substantial principles
offered for a better education.
A. Fundamental Consideration Based upon the End of
Education .
Education must consider, first, the end it seeks -
the goal toward which it tends. This will be the determining
feature of its philosophy and method. As education has to do
with human beings who are the subjects of education, the end
of the study itself should be adapted to and by the end of
the individual, whom education seeks to educate.
The end of education to the Deweyites is synonymous
with means. It is relative, natural - and man's life finds
its morality in man's making. The end to the scholastic is
an objective in itself, absolute as is the Creator, the Maker
of man. It finds its sanction of laws in the same supreme
Law Maker who is man's beginning and end, God.
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Dagobert D. Runes in the latest "symposium-compend"
,
1
Twentieth Century Philosophy
,
expresses the present personal
thought of John Dewey illustrating the pragmatism which is
basic in his system.
Pragmatism . . . presents itself as an extension of
historical empiricism with this fundamental difference,
that it does not insist upon antecedent phenomena
;
not upon precedents bu^ upon the possibiTTties of ac-
tion, and this change in~poTnt of view is almosir"rev -
olutionary in its consequences . An empiricism which
is content wTth repeated facts already past has no
place for possibility and for liberty. It cannot
find room for general conceptions or ideas, at least
no more than to consider them as summaries or records.
But when we take the point of view of pragmatism we
see that the general ideas have a very different role to
play than that of reporting and registering past ex-
periences. They are the bases for organizing future
observations and experiences .
^
This fundamental conception of pragmatism is an
expression of the point of view which is frequently referred
to by followers of Dewey as instrumentalism.
It implies that experience alone is the sole means,
tool or instrument to produce the most satisfactory, practical,
utilitarian, workable adjustment between the organism and
environment, that is, between a changing society and the con-
ditions, potentialities and limitations of a dynamic material
nature.
1 Word used in description of book in recommendation
of Dr. E. S. Brightman of Boston University.
2 John Dewey, Twentieth Century Philosophy (New York:
Philosophical Library, 1943) p. 462.
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From this philosophy seem to flow two errors, (1) an
incorrect view of the nature of the world, of the child, of
morality and of democracy, and (2) an incorrect view of the
purpose or end of education and life.
As an introduction to the consideration of the se-
quence of seeming errors, the philosophy of pragmatism will
be considered in itself and in its ramifications.
The following considerations describe the de-evolution-
izing of the metaphysical to the plane of sensible experience
and pragmatic sanctions.
If metaphysical ideas, writes Leslie Walker, are to
be valued according to their practical bearings and
if our conception of such bearings or effects is the
whole of our conception of an object, their truth will
be determined in part at least by purposes and needs,
and our evaluations will depend largely upon the emo-
tions and the will. The thesis which Professor James
defends in his 'Will to Believe' is precisely this,
that our emotions not only do, but ought, in some cases
at any rate, to act as determinants of choice in re-
gard to rival theories. This is of the very essence of
pragmatism; ... . Already in his pre-pragma tic 'Riddles,',
Dr. Schiller had suggested that it might be possible to
provide food for the starving philosopher, simply by bas-
ing our metaphysics on our science; and eventually the
principle was found in the method of science ... in
framing hypotheses with a view to controlling nature and in
verifying those hypotheses in experience by means of
their practical results.
Pragmatism claims that this is the universal form
which all cognition takes. 'All mental life is purposive.'
Cognition is due to the exigencies of human nature which
awaken, in us the desire to organize the crude material
of experience and 'transmute it into palatable, manage-
able, and liveable forms.' ... We then experiment, that
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is, we carry into execution the proposed action and
await results. If nature, as modified by our action
,
responds on all occasions in a way we desire, our
postulate is validated and in so far true. If nature
does not respond as we desire, we frame a new
hypothesis and experiment again.
3
In other words pragraatists begin with an hypothesis
in acquiring knowledge which they seek to verify. Action
follows and if the consequent harmonizes with preconceptions,
the hypotheses are so framed as to satisfy our needs and then
are verified in experience. Environment is adapted to our
natural needs. True is evaluated by the satisfaction accorded
our needs and the pragmatic criterion of truth is the power
of consequences to satisfy the needs of our whole nature.
This so-called satisfaction or sum of satisfactions,
however, is vague and ambiguous.
Satisfaction, as Walker says, not only varies in
quality, tone, and intensity with the individual, but
also with the particular truth claims in question.
Satisfaction, like pleasures, can neither be defined
nor measured; except by a multitude of standards which
do not admit of comparison and cannot be tabulated or
scaled. One man prefers one kind of satisfaction,
another, another, ... .
So long, then, as the pragmatist is unable to tell
us what satisfactoriness is, we can hardly discuss
further its value as a criterion of truth. 4
3 Leslie J. Walker, Theories of Knowledge (London:
Longmans , Green and Company, 1924)
, pp. 15-17.
4 Ibid.
, pp. 615-617
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The question may be raised, however, whether the
satisfaction of emotional needs has any claim at all
to be regarded as a criterion of truth. Have we any
right to appeal to the emotions in order to settle
whether a theory is true or untrue?
Again, by whose emotions and by whose needs is a claim
to truth to' be judged? Is each one a judge to him-
self? If so, we shall have contradictory verdicts,
for each one will declare that to be true which seems
to him to satisfy his needs. The selfish and the car-
nal ... regardless of consequences to anyone else,
will declare that naturalism is valid ... . 5
The whole question turns upon one point. Is the true
subordinate to the useful and the good? Does the seeker
after truth merely aim at satisfying a purpose and grati-
fying a need? Does science exist merely that it may be
used to harmonise our experience? Is the whole function
and nature of all theoretical constructions from the
highest to the most elementary and simple, directed in
the end to the furtherance of human control over reality,
and the transformation of it to suit our human needs?
if it is not, utility and satisfactoriness are certainly
inadequate and of very little value for either practical
or theoretical purposes wherever the question of truth
comes in. 6
The pragmatic instrumentalists claim that they apply
hypothesis as described above to one's self for the purpose
of determining what is true for one's self. This, however,
is subjectivism. The individual human being is more than
an individual; he is a personality. He is more than a
personality individuated in himself because he has by nature
5 Ibid.
, pp. 593 and 595
6 Ibid.
, pp. 619-620
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a sociality. This sociality determines and is determined
by a relationship with others. It is an objective reality
existing beyond the subjectivism of the individual. The
pragmatic instrumentalist, therefore, cannot attain all
truth by inquiring through experience into the satisfaction
he seeks for himself alone. This is but part of truth.
As democracy in the ideal is the consideration of others as
well as self, the subject is forced into a field beyond
himself, hence pragmatic sanction with subjective limits is
insufficient as a norm of collective action.
Turner gives the following evaluation of the system
of pragmatism:
Pragmatism is individualistic. Despite the disclaimers
of some of its exponents, it sets up the Protagorean
principle, 'Man is the measure of all things.' For if
pragmatism means anything, it means that human conse-
quences, 'consequences to you and me* are the test of
the meaning and truth of our concepts, judgments, and
reasonings. Pragmatism is normalistic. It denies the
validity of content of universal concepts and scornfully
rejects the mere possibility of universal, all-includ-
ing or even many- including reality. It is, by im-
plication, sensistic. For in describing the functional
value of concepts it restricts that function to im-
mediate or remote sense-experience. It is idealistic.
For ... it is guilty of the fundamental error of idealism
when it makes reality to be coextensive with experience,
and describes its doctrine of perception in terms of
Cartesian subjectivism. It is, in a sense, anarchistic.
Discarding intellectualistic logic, it discards prin-
ciples, and has no substitute for them except individual
experience. ... It consistently appeals to future pros-
perity as a pragmatic test of its truth, thus leaving
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the verdict to time and a future generation. But with
the elements of error and disorganization which it has
embodied in its method and adapted in its synthesis,
it has done much, so the intellectualist thinks, to
prejudice its case .
^
It must be kept foremost in the mind that education
is for the whole man, implying all the possessions which
are man 1 s by reason of his human nature including his end.
It must likewise be stressed that sociality is one of the
peculiar properties of that nature which determines its
mode of life, as Dewey indicated when he said that the
educative process is not to be effected in a vacuum.
Pragmatism seems to be an unsatisfactory solution
for the attainment of truth by the individual because its
appeal to the satisfactoriness of the subject must be based
upon some criterion in that subject. This criterion is
either blind and uncontrolled by reason or controlled by
reason. If it is uncontrolled by reason it is arbitrary
and an arbitrary judge cannot be trusted. If it goes back
of volition or a moral sense of proportion, it must be
governed by some guide for its satisfaction, thus reason and
not the will is the test of certitude. This cannot be prac-
tical reason alone with a rejection of pure reason, in es-
tablishing the criterion of certitude. Practical reason
alone, or to the experimentalist or instrumentalist that
knowledge which is an instrument by which we dominate our
7 William Turner, "Pragmatism", Catholic Encyclopedia ,
XII, pp. 337-338
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environment, is gained from sensible experience which is
held the only source of knowledge. Insofar as this
interpretation holds, it is nothing other than positivism.
Positivism assumes that sense experiences are the
only object of human knowledge, an assumption which it
does not prove. It is unsatisfactory because it simply
rejects all other possible forms of knowledge without
giving fundamental reasons for the rejection.
The system is true insofar as it is predicated on
the thesis that our knowledge has its starting point in
sense experience. It errs, however, claiming that all
knowledge stops there. This is a mere assumption and any
system founded upon assumption is unsatisfactory to man's
inquisitive nature.
Moreover, concrete beings and individual relations
are not only perceptible to our senses, but they have also
causes, laws of existence, and constitution in objectivity.
These are intelligible. Causes and laws pass beyond a par-
ticularness and contingency of individual facts and are as
fundamentally real as the particular facts observed or the
other individual facts they produce or control. It is true
that they cannot be perceived by the senses as only the
action is perceived. A human faculty, however, known to be
possessed to us by our own consciousness can know and explain
them; namely, intelligence.
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According to positivism, our abstract concepts or
general ideas are mere collective representations of the
experimental order. The idea of "man" is the blended image
of all m©n we have experienced. Fundamentally this is in
error, for an image of a man is always an image of a par-
ticular uan and can represent only that man. A collection
of images is but a succession of images following one another,
each representing a concrete object known by observation.
An idea on the contrary abstracts from concrete extension
and may be applied to an indefinite number of objects in
a class.
Experimental analogy is limited to concrete objects
observed and its generalizations are relative. General
ideas are the result not of a particular perception of an
individual object or objects but an abstraction therefrom
applicable to the unity and identity of an indefinite number
of objects in a class. They have a generality without limit
and are independent of any concrete determination. Mere
sensible experience is insufficient to account for these
general ideals. Therefore, it seems that sense experiences
alone are not the only object of human knowledge.®
8 Cf . George M. Sauvage, "Positivism", Catholic Encyclopedia
XII, pp. 312-514.
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Regarding this positivistic view that sensible
experience is the only object of knowledge, Mahar writes:
The principle of causality appeals to the reason
both as op. objective"^ transcendent law, embracing
all contingent existence, and as an imperative in-
satiable impulse in quest of truth. The instinct
to seek out the ultimate why as well as how is the
essential outcome of the rational constitution of
the human mind. It is this inappeasable curiosity
which most of all distinguishes man from the brute
animal; and has been the motive power which has
effected every great advance in the extension of
human knowledge. The view, therefore, that the
highest development of human reason can content
itself with the mere accumulation, registration,
and generalization of sensible facts, and can re-
main in stolid indifference to all those great
problems which have engrossed the loftiest intelli-
gence from Plato and Aristotle to St. Thomas and
Dante, and again from these down to Newton and
Leibnitz, is possible only to a mind blinded by
anti-theological prejudice.
9
The foregoing detailed consideration of the phil-
osophies of pragmatism and positivism has been necessary
for our appraisal of instrumental ism as conceived by
John Dewey. It has been given for a correct evaluation.
9 Mahar, Psychology
, p. 281.
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It adds up to the statement that the end of education and
the means of education are the same. The fundamental
principles of this school and the seeming inherent errors
have been expounded with the view of determining whether
this philosophy of education which has as its end or aim,
one that is identical with the means to the end, is a
more satisfactory philosophy upon which to found an
educative process for man than is scholasticism.
The positive implications of the experimental,
evolutionistic, progressive growth ideations of the in-
strumentalist school as applied to education are the em-
phasis on the immediately practical or utilitarian studies,
the stress laid upon immediate interests, felt needs, and
experiences, and the importance of group co-operation as
both means and end of education.
The negative implications are the denial of an ul-
timate end for man, directive of human action, the rejection
of fixed standards, and the refusal to consider any truth
beyond the scope of the sensible or any motive beyond pro-
gressive growth for its own sake.
The end of education to the scholastic is neither
pragmatic, relative, nor changing. It is the same as the
end in his philosophy of life. Man exists for a definite
purpose. That purpose is found by the scholastic in his
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very reason of being. Man did not make himself but was made
by a First Cause called God. That same God Who was man's
beginning is also man's end. In man's nature are found the
motives for seeking that end, the insatiable desire for
truth and the continual seeking of good. A natural end will
not satisfy either, for nature itself" does not contain all
truth nor all goodness. Only a supernatural end can fulfil
man's destiny. Therefore, man to reach his end which is an
objective reality must prosecute his earthly life, using
every means at his disposal, for the attainment of his super
natural end.
The end and the means are distinct, the means being
used to attain the end. The end is as definite and absolute
as is God and completes the quest of man. The end is known
by human reason, which acknowledges the existence of knowl-
edge other than that called sense knowledge. It admits
knowledge gained through revelation and taught by Christ, as
God, as directive means to his ultimate goal. It requires
the practice of religion, which binds man to God in his
individual life, and assists him with sanctions and motives
to quicken and aid him in living his life correctly in
relation to society.
The difficulty which modern educators of contrary
schools find with scholasticism is that it appeals to

139
knowledge other than sense knowledge. The materialistic
schools deny the spiritual, discredit revelation and dis-
regard theology. The assertions of Bode and others contained
in Wahlquist's Philosophy of American Education seem to
demonstrate how utterly impossible it is to reconcile the
contradictory tenets of the scholastics who hold a necessary
objective cause of our being, above it and effecting it, and
those who place that cause in themselves or in matter. Many
American educators of this latter school maintain also that
the basic concepts of the scholastics are precluded in a
democracy. A consideration of this objection will be
discussed later.
Scholastics admit that immaterial beings cannot be
perceived by sense experience but hold that their existence
is not contrary to man 1 s intelligence. Moreover, if their
existence is required as a cause and a condition of the
actual existence of material things, they certainly exist.
They cannot, indeed, be known in the same way as material
things, but this is no reason for rejecting them as unknowable
to our intelligence
.
In "Education at the Crossroads," Jacques Maritain
summarizes the aims of scholastic education as follows:
... the aim of education ... is to guide man in the
evolving dynamism through which he shapes himself as a
human person - armed with knowledge, strength of judg-
ment, and moral virtues - while at the same time con-
veying to him the spiritual heritage of the nation and
the civilization in which he is involved, and preserving
in this way the century-old achievements of generations.
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The utilitarian aspect of education - which enables
youth to get a job and make a living - must surely not
be disregarded, for the children of man are not made for
aristocratic leisure. But this practical end is best
provided by the general human capacities developed... .
Truth- -which does not depend on us but what is— truth
is not a set of ready-made formulas'To be passively
recorded, so as to have the mind closed and enclosed
by them
.
In the field of education, this pragmatic theory . .
.
can hardly produce in youth anything but a scholarly
skepticism equipped with the best techniques of mental
training and the best scientific methods, which will be
unnaturally used against the very grain of intelligence,
so as to cause minds to distrust the very idea of truth
and wisdom, and to give up any hope of inner dynamic
unity.
The wrong begins when the object to be taught and
the primacy of the object are forgo t"Fen and when the
cult of the means - not to an end, but without an end -
only ends up in a psychological worship of the subject.^-0
The philosophy of John Dewey regarding end and means
leaves the subject of the educative process in a state of
uncertainty seeking always and ever in progressive evolution
for what may come to him in the form of higher perfection.
He does not know what the truth or perfection is finally going
to be. It is a dynamic struggle but without a charted course
save satisfaction to the chooser and seeker. This seems an
uncertain process, and all the more so, because with human
10 "Jacques Maritain," Education at the Crossroads
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 194T) pp. 10-14.
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nature as it is, the individual will be easily discouraged
and the purpose of education will be nullified. Motives
will be lacking to inspire in the difficult problems man
must face both as a man and as a member of society. The
end which man seeks of and in his nature becomes an illusive
spectre always just beyond his grasp. The fundamentals of the
subjective pragmatic system have led to partial or complete
skepticism in the past. There seems to be no remedy in the
pragmatic instrumentalism of Dewey to prevent the same
skepticism especially when we consider that man's emotional
nature may at times function to upset the stability of a
life without a foreseen goal.
Scholasticism sets a definite reality for a goal,
predicated upon reason and revelation. It defines valid
knowledge in a manner not only not contradictory to man's
nature, but harmonious with it. It explains man's origin,
discloses his nature and exposes his last end.
It recognizes the changes and modes of living in
different times and places. It is not obliged to alter the
fundamentals and must vary only the accidentals of the edu-
cative process to meet them. It admits and counsels free
and generous use of every scientifically proved method for
assisting those to be educated to continued growth and ad-
vancement provided there be no interference with the primary
end of man.
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By reason of its consideration of the ultimate end. it
promotes a sound moral and religious training; an intellect
enlightened by truth, and guided by the teachings of the
relation of man to God; a disciplined will, which through
achieved self-control and firm adherence to moral principles,
strives for the highest level of human excellence; an appre-
ciation of the duties, obligations and rights of man and
society, ordained by a Creator; a recognition of harmony
applicable to all the objects of the universe, nature, man
and society, and instills a love of virtue. Above all, it
gives the objective reason for seeking truth and avoiding
error, for striving for good and abstaining from evil. It
believes that self-control is quite as necessary as self-
realization. It provides for the sanction which is necessary
to keep perverted human nature from bursting the bonds of
nature with consequent injury to man himself or to his
neighbor in society. It establishes the norm by which the
society of nations, different in their physical and political
make-up, may meet on common grounds for the pursuit of justice
and the establishment of tranquil relationships.
Scholasticism offers in its principles of life and
philosophy of education a definite destiny and the means
thereto. It discourages skepticism and enhances hope. It
provides for a full life here and a complete life hereafter.

143
B. An Evaluat ion Based on the Concept ion of Ult imete
Values.
Vrlues certainly should have prominent pert in
determining the worth of an educational system. The two
schools egain pre at opposite poles regarding values, the
one deeming them temporal and relative, the other, eternal
and ultimate,
Relativism (found in the educational principles of
Dewey) philosophically considers truth as varying
from individual to individual, from group to group,
or from time to time, having no objective standard,
end that righteousness of an action and goodness of
an object depend on or consist in the attitude taken
towards it by some individual or group, and hence
may vary from individual to individual end from
group to group.
H
Absolutism (proposed by the scholastics) is the
opposite of relativism, the doctrine that objective
or absolute, and not merely relative end human,
truth, is possible, that standards of value are
absolute, objective, superhuman, eternal. 12
There is no question of the philosophy of Dewey and
his followers on this score for direct quotations have been
given previously deprecating absolute velues.
Relativism seems to be basically in error. It denies
implicitly what it affirms explicitly. It affirms that all
truths are relative, changeable, variable, but cleims this
11 Dagobert D. Runes, The Dictionary of Philosophy (Hew
York: Philosophical Library, 1942)
,
p. 269.
12 Ibid.
. p. 98.
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one assertion is unchangeable. It also implies all
propositions can be true and false, leading, therefore, to
skepticism for man crnnot be formally certain.
In considering relativism, light will be oast on the
errors of this system by a brief consideration of the
characteristics of anthropocentrism, autonomism, and in-
dividualism which are its component parts.
Whereas in traditional culture God was the center of
all that exists and the highest motive of all human activity,
in this modern materialistic relativism, man usurps God's
place.
By a single act of his independent will, he sets at
naught the appeal of all the inspiring ideals for
which the human heart has striven down through the
turmoil of centuries .... He eoknowledges no being
higher than himself. By the brilliance of his own
splendor he would fain throw all other light into
the shade, eclipsing it to utter darkness. He makes
everything else dance dizzily about him... . In the
realm of sense and the world of the thought; in the
sphere of his emotions and tendencies; in everything
to which his will inclines, in all that motivates
his actions, he sees mirrored only his own 'Ego 1 .^
This anthropocentric bias manifests itself in
autonomism in the decisions of choice of will and in in-
dividualism in the realm of thought.
13 Andrew J. Krzesinski, Is Modern Culture Doomed? (Hew
York: The Devin-Adair Company, 1942)
,
p. 40.
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Autonomism or self actuation hps passed through
successive stages to its present state of development. The
principles of evaluation are fundamental to this school of
thought and accepted as determining. However, evolution
upon which autonomism is based is but a theory and not an
established feet. The categorical imperative of Kant was
autonomist ic in form; making man a lew unto himself.
Krzesinski says:
In its fine. 1 phase autonomism appears as a spiritual
state grounded in the consciousness of absolute freedom
of action and in an idolatrous worship of one's own
will which ... came to be regarded es the sole founda-
tion of morality. 14
Autonomism ... has proved t o be pernicious in its
effects. The animal instincts in human neture •••
have been allowed to override sane reason ... they have
entered the family; they have encroached upon social
life and private life. Everywhere their overruling
force manifests itself unmistakably in the wake of
havoc thet they leave behind. Anarchy, racketeering
and banditry, violent and unscrupulous imposition of
one man's will upon that of other's, feverish efforts
to humor each pessing whim, to follow the wildest
fancies, to gratify every sudden impulse—often at
the cost of human life itself and of grave social
disorders—these are but some of the disastrous re-
sults of this vicious, reckless, unbridled autonomism. 15
Individualism insists on self-expression. It mani-
fests a chronic dislike for the pest, an inclination to
destroy all that human genius has builded in previous cen-
14 Krzesinski, Ibid.
. p. 41-4E.
15 lb id.
. pp. 42-43.
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turies, a persistent proposal to construct something quite
new with a distinctive stamp of his individual self.
Ilex Stirner and i'riedrich Nietzsche ore exponents
of this ideology snd show how far individualism will go
once it assumes authority. Unfurling the banner of revolt
against secular end religious authority, they selfishly
insisted upon universal recognition of their own alleged
rights,
Stirner writes:
I am the greatest solitary; what is detached from me
is of no concern to me ... . I am entitled to every
thing I have strength to take. 16
When you heve demolished that v/hich is sacred then
you have mede it your own. 17
I wish to be everything that I can be and I want to
have everything thet I can heve. If others are similar
and have similar things, what is that to me?
As an egoist, the good of this human community does
not effect my heart. I offer it nothing, I enjoy only
what it hes to offer.
I am a species unto myself, I have no norm, no lew,
no pettern ... what concern of mine is the public good?l°
16 Max Stirner, Per Einzige und Sein Eigenthum .
(Leipsig: 1854), p. 491.
17 Op^ Pit
.
. p. 128.
18 Op. Cit..T>P. 235-239-241.
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Metzscheen individualism, after scuttling belief in
God put man in God*s piece and recognized in himself the
highest good and the sole purpose of his acts. This self-
idoletry is not religion, but is its antithesis. The irony
of the situation is manifested by Ziegler who called himself
religious—a pious godless man.
It may be well understood that proponents of the
Dewey school will disclaim any such doctrines end this must
be admitted. ISo member of their school will express himself
as bluntly as Stirner, Nietzsche and Ziegler. However, it
must be pointed out that the elevation of the egoist self,
a concomitant of subjectivism and individualism, hes so
resulted by putting into practise that egoistic principle.
The only factor to preclude this is education which the
instrumentalist school fells, back upon in order to preclude
these extremes. Man, however, is not educated in e vecuum
and has many temptetions in his own neture and instincts
which make it hard for him and harder for education to over-
come in practicel life, and instrumental ism proposes to be
practicel.
Relativism cerries its own sanction which is change-
able. But a mutable sanction or norm cannot suffice to
control man in his relations, as well may witness the daily
story of men's lives.
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Allport scorns ''a set of cheap and easy absolutes
(which) may satisfy adherents of a totalitarian state but
not a democracy.
"
19 First of all, to call the Eternal God
cheap is blasphemous, and secondly, to describe absolutes
as easy demonstrates that this author has never endeavored
conscientiously to observe in living what the follower of
Cnrist endeavors to practice as an attempt at a perfect
life. "Tne fright" he describes as accompanying the
ap] earance of rigid formulations set for the guidance of
conduct certainly must irk him in practising his citizen-
ship for laws and regulations are quite necessary even in
a democracy in order to avert chaos.
What Randall claims is "This cowardly choice of
fixed and antecedent realities, is not in itself a choice
alone since it does not inherently depend upon man but is
objective, regardless of man's own will to accept or reject
them. It is the contrary of cowardice, for man in yielding
his will and his life to a higher cause than himself is a
brave man. Bravery of this sort, manifested more or less
in a natural mode, is commended daily in our news and by
19 Gordon Allport, The Philosophy of John Dewey , p. 280.
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awards of merit by our Country to those who, in our darkest
hour, jeopardize life and even yield it for a good cause in
war
.
The transcendental called "empty" by Dewey and "a
vague sentimental aspiration" is the very factor which in-
spired to highest ideals the millions of men who have lived
satisfied lives in the world prior to his fabrication of
instrumental ism.
If success is any criterion to the pragmatistshow is
it possible that the test applied to the work of founders
and builders of our own nation can escape them. Our very
constitution as a democracy is based upon faith in the
existence of a God and the United States still thrives as
a glorious nation. The ideals of our nation are neither
"empty" nor "vague" but may rapidly deteriorate if its
noble principles are forsaken. Such a fate has happened
to other nations in history.
Skepticism has never inspired men to noble deeds.
Relativism is a form of skepticism. The result of skepti-
cism is a community of cynics who hever have been known for
construction. Uncertainty has never molded any group of
people oo a determined effort nor assiduous prosecution of
purpose nor high results and accomplishments. Relativism
is the sibling of uncertainty.
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The scholastic on the other hand submits absolute
standards for man's life, shaping man to lead a normal,
useful and co-operative life in the community and guidine-
him in the social sphere. It awakens and strengthens the
sense of freedom and of obligation and responsibility.
This correct social living is another essential aim in
education according to the scholasticism which inspires
to charity and quickens man to the loftiest heights of
loyalty and service of his fellows and his nation. Through
this aim he grows in personal and spiritual progress to his
ultimate end, his objective destiny, his certain goal, God.
Maritain^ writing on the dynamics of education as
expressed in the scholastic system outlines, in a clear
manner their practical application in education. The dy-
namic factors or agents at work are the inner vitality of
the student's mind and the activity of the teacher, the
basic dispositions to be fostered in the pupil and the
fundamental norms of education for the teacher.
The mind's natural activity on the part of the learner
and the intellectual guidance on the part of the teacher
are both dynamic factors in education, but . . . the
principle agent in education, is the internal vital
principle in the one to be educated ... the teacher is
only ... a ministerial agent.
The same man in his entirety is an individual and a
person; he is a person by reason of the spiritual sub-
sistence of his soul and he is an individual by reason
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of that principle of non-specific diversity which is
matter, end which makes the components of a same species
different from each other.
••• Educetion must center on the development and
liberation of the liberal person. What I am criticising
is that false form of appreciation of the individual
person which, while looking at individuality instead of
personality, reduces education and progress of man to
the mere freeing of the material ego. Such educators
mistakingly believe they are providing men with the
freedom of expansion end autonomy to which personality
aspires while at the same time they deny the value of
all discipline end asceticism, as well as the necessity
of striving toward self-perfection. As a result,
instead of fulfilling himself, man disperses himself
and disintegrates.
Other educetors, contrariwise, misconstrue the dis-
tinctions between personality end individuality es a
separation. They think we beer in ourselves two
seperete beings that of the individual and that of the
person. ... Instead of e genuine human personality,
seeled with the mysterious face of its Creator, there
appeers a mesk, that of the conventional man or that
of the rubber-stamped conscience, ' incorporated. '20
The following fundamental dispositions are to be
fostered in scholastic education:
First, the love of truth, which is the primary
tendency of any intellectual nature.
Second, the love of good and justice, and even the
love of heroic feats ... •
20 Merita in. Ibid.
. pp. 29-36.
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Third,... simplicity and openness with regard to
existence
.
Fourth,... the sense of a job well done, for next
to the attitude toward existence there is nothing
more basic in man's psychic life than the attitude
toward work.
Fifth,... the sense of co-operation... . BA
The following are the fundamental norms of education
in this system according to Mar it a in:
First,... to foster those fundamental dispositions
which enable the principal agent to grow in the life
of the mind.
Second,... to center attention on the inner depths
of personality and its preconscious spiritual dynamism.
Third,... the whole work of education and teaching
must tend to unify, not to spread out;... •
Fourth,... demands that teaching liberate intelli-
gence instead of burdening it,... with the liberation
of the mind through the mastery of reason over what is
learned and through the primacy of real knowledge over
mere training. 22
In this wise, the method of scholasticism founded
upon universal truth is adapted to the education of man,
who in this system knows where he is going. He is not un-
certain of his goal. TTho, ^hy, That, end TThence are the
21 Ibid.
. pp. 27-38.
22 Ibid.
. pp. 39-57.
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questions answered unwaveringly by this school. It finds
no difficulty in making use of every means science csn
afford to assist—but the eyes of man, as it were, are
never to be diverted from the end. Microscopic methods
which are minutely involved with themselves end forget the
primary object of education are not foremost; the telescopic
which enlarge and keep manifest the broader view of life
and its mean ing are encouraged. Shere is nothing in this
system contrary to nature. There is more in it than can be
supplied by any egocentric system.
C. Evaluat ion Based Upon the Concepts of Naturalism
and Supernatural ism .
Naturalism has the inherent tendency of looking upon
nature as the one original and fundamental source of ell that
exists, hence attempts to explain every thing in terms of
nature. The limits of nature rre the limits of existing
reality. It denies the possibility of any transitory inter-
vention of God in nature end of any revelation and permanent
supernatural order for man. Materialistic naturalism asserts
that matter is the only reality. Man is a conscious auto-
maton whose whole activity, mental as well as physiological,
is determined by material antecedents. In aesthetics,
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naturalism rests on the assumption that art must imitate
nature without any idealization, and without regard to the
moral order. Moral science is treated by them in much the
same manner as natural science. The moral law is a sub-
jective result of associations and instincts evolved from
the experience of the useful end agreeable, or of the
harmful and painful consequences of certain actions. It
does not deal with lews existing entecedently to human
actions. It is genetic, doing for human set ions whet
natural science does for physical phenomena. It ettempts
to discover through inference from the facts of human
conduct, the laws to which they happen to conform. Human
behavior, then, is largely a function of environment and
circumstances. 2^
The philosophy of John Dewey follows this school.
Nature is supposed to furnish the law end the end
of development; ours it is to follow and conform to
her ways.24
One of the weakening effects of this system is
limiterianism. This is e prohib it ion-idealogy which limits
thought exclusively to the representation of the external
23 Gf. Dubray, "Naturalism. " Catholic Encyclopedia
.
X, pp. 713-715. Runes, Ibid. . 205-206.
24 John Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 131.
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side of the world. "In it, modern man never plumbs the
depths of his own soul. n25 p. second effect is mechanization,
ss is witness the gigantic evolution of industry from the
time of the industrial revolution. In it, needs are created
artificially and production is increased without any checks
because gain is the sole consideration. Each new mechai ical
improvement results in a corresponding increase of products
with proportionate decrease in the number of hands employed.
"Economic instability results. In mechanistic naturalism,
man loses interest, because he is deprived of the self-
set isfact ion which is bound up in creations of his own.
With interest goes the imaginative, end life becomes a
monotonous boring state in which animal nature alone is
directed to and directs. lack of purpose, dearth of higher
ideals cruses a void in the machine life, where life, too,
becomes but mechanical. In days of unemployment and de-
pression, a regular accompaniment of the economies of this
mechanical system, the wretched condition of machine man is
pitiful.
With the exclusion of the supernatural, atheism
naturally follows, for then there is no need of God. Social-
istic totalitarianism or communism follows the materialist ic
25 Krzesinski, Is Modern Culture Doomed?
. p. 51.
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principle proposed first by Epicurus. Fuerbach accepted this
material principle which he claimed was sufficient to explain
life. Mrrx adopted the same principle and applied it to
social life to complete the reduction of man, his cause and
effect, to a natural material state which is accepted as the
end of man in place of the supernatural.
It is worthy of note that opponents of the super-
natural point to the absolute system of thought as the
breeding ground of the totalitarian state, when in truth and
in historical reality, we witness the very opposite, ^hen
the supernatural was pushed aside, extreme materialistic
socialism took over to the detriment not only of traditional
institutions but also of individuals themselves.
Egoism is a product of this system which places "
<
I"
in plrce of God. The selfish way of life has resulted in
placing in the hands of a few the vast majority of the world's
goods while millions are in want. It is manifested in a
larger way in national life in which each individual nation
becomes the center of thought and effort, resulting in
"Nationalism." The league of Nations was predoomed to failure
because the supernatural was repudiated and selfish egoism
became the moving force which prompted the settlement of
difficulties.
In naturalism, man's belief in the ability of his
reason to recognize truth never rises above empirical bounds.
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The heights which may be sought and reached are thereby
limited. Degrading depths, however, have been plumbed by
self-centered sensual men seeking the expression of
nrturrl instincts. This tendency impugns the dignity of
man and lowers the ideals which society should cherish.
Realism in art and literature is centered on the human body.
The morbid becomes an habitual mental diet till even
patriotism loses the force of its appeal.
Money blinds man with cupidity. Charity begins and
ends at home. Naturalism results in hedonism and sense en-
joyment which take the place of the higher activities of
man*s nobler capacities. Sexualism becomes a dominating
influence in drama, and theatres. Licentiousness is rampant.
The extent of venereal disease arising from promiscuity
shocks the world today by its alarming prevalence.
This spirit of naturalism is manifested in the col-
lectivism of Karl Marx's dialectic materialism or communism.
This system projects as its aim the elevation of the working
class, but observable results point to the domination of the
few, considerable discord among the many, with little evident
relief to the masses.
Applied to national life, the idealogy of egoism known
as racism has hurled the world today into the greatest cata-
clysmic struggle of history.
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The heterogeneous constitution of the naturalistic
system subjects man to constant change with consequent in-
stability. Men's moods end tendencies, his character and
his whole personality are effected, his mind becomes
susceptible and develops nothing higher than e superficial
appreciation of the meaning and particular importance or
bearing of events eround him. Agitators and propegandists
find men of this calibre easy prey for their own purposes.
Men is thus forsaken by heving forsaken his supernatural
life. He is starving in the midst of plenty and discontented
in man-made limits.
John Dewey and his followers make claim on the
contrary that by their education they seek to lift man from
this depleted life to a full life by making man realize
himself in all his netural powers and possessions.
We are influenced however, by historical fects and
the psychology of history to form the prudent judgment that
the denial of God or the supernatural does only end can only
result in one, a few, or ell of the defections enumerated
in previous considerations.
Even if it could be grented that the principles of
individual subject ism or instrumental ism are sufficiently
high enough to satisfy man, if they are learned end followed,
it would seem that the common man would be indifferent and
lack sufficient inspiration to seek out and learn Dewey*
s
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method and principles or practice them. Men would be content
with the selfishness of his own satisfaction and would not be
influenced by a sanction strong enough to force him to
recognize or complete the educative process of -Dewey. The
system lacks sufficient effectiveness in constructive results
and is powerless to prevent destructive consequences of the
denial of the supernatural.
Scholastics prescribe an integral education to cor-
respond to an integral humanism providing the common man with
the means of his personal fulfilment, not only in regard to
his labor but also for his social and political activities
in the civil commonwealth and for the activities of his
leisure hours. Scholasticism endeavors to adapt and use all
applicable natural as well as supernatural sources, ppst and
present, in the formation of a Christian gentleman of culture
and scholrrship for the greater glory of ^od.
The scholastic system presents a supernatural end and
supplies supernatural means to assist man to that end. It
recognizes a deficient state of human nature in man and claims
that man requires an objective aid to reach fulfilment in
complete satisfaction. Scholasticism does not claim re-
sponsibility for the rejection and frustration of its teachings.
It does hold that every necessary means is supplied therein
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for the attainment of man's objective end, that every highest
inspiration is given to urge man to seek his end, end that
the sanction of the Maker of man and the Judge of man is or-
dained to prompt obedience to law and the pursuit of a proper
educative process.
D. Evaluations Based Upon the Source of the Srnct ion
of Morality .
The sanction of morality for the instrumentalist
school is pragmatic, resting with the individual or a col-
lection of individuals. As Dewey has already been quoted,
"moral Judgment ... is a statement of experience in terms
of its modes of control of its own evolving. "26 The sanction
of morality and law for the scholastic is man's Maker, God.
All that has been said heretofore regarding the re-
sult of egoistic standards and sanctions bears application
here. History gives ample evidence to the deterioration of
society itself where the individual is a law unto himself.
Such a system demands that each member of the society of
individuals must recognize and respect the inherent right
in others of the very privileges he demands for himself.
It must be recognized that human nature, as it is in reality,
needs something more than it possesses for the inculcation
of this reciprocal idealistic state. A mature force stronger
————————
v
26 Dewey - Human Nature and Conduct , p. 336.
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than the individual himself is demanded else might becomes
right and personal privilege is lost. The welfare )f the
individual and the solidarity of the state require more
than individual recognition. An educational system predi-
cated on the hope that success will crov/n its efforts seems
to be unfair to the individual who will suffer till the
principles are found by man himself and learned, and to the
state made up of these individuals still striving for the
learned and possessed perfection.
The scholastic seeking a certain security for men
rather than a chaos dependent on whim, fancy, good will or
even education inquires into reason to ascertain if there is
not something more than the uncertainties disclosed by the
instrumentalists' system. He is not a coward in so doing
for he is aiming at higher stakes than mere finite satis-
faction. He does not wish to be hampered by unnecessary
human impediments in a higher struggle of life than with
mere materials.
Scholastics admit that moral law is knowable to
reason. The due regulation of our free actions is simply
their right ordering with a view to the perfection of our
rational nature. They insist that this law has its ultimate
obligation in the will of the Creator by Whom nature was
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fashioned and Who inspires in us its right ordering as a duty.
They explain thrt the ultimate sanction is loss of our last
end through violation of the natural or supernatural laws.
Reason will enable man to a very great extent to
recognize nature's ideals. Much, however, will escape his
reasoning powers and many essential duties may be disregarded,
especially as theology explains the state of obscurity of
man's reasoning powers, the cause of the morbid craving im-
pelling us to transgress reason and the lack of control over
the passions, by reason of the original defection of man
from God.
Moreover, man in himself will be destitute of the
strong motives for obedience to law afforded by the sense of
obligation to God by reason of creation, conservation and
destiny. Scholastics insist, therefore, that morality end
religion cannot be divorced.
Scholasticism declares that those regulations of action
which reason reveals as originating in the Divine essence and
promulgated by the Author of Kature, are universal, encompass-
ing all, immutable, admitting no change, and absolute, pro-
viding for no dispensation. They hold that those rules of
conduct are obligatory under the penalty of sanctions and
are mandatory even in the face of denials and violations.
This is a direct relation between ^"od and man, which is
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morality end religion. 27
Scholasticism invokes this principle in the individual
life and in community life. Following these tenets does not
stifle liberty nor freedom but only license and morbidity.
True liberty is to be found in the healthy action of the
natural powers. These laws prohibit only what is contrary
to right reason and nature. 28
This scholastic system contributes to the authority of
the established state. It recognizes that authority is
founded in God and requires obedience to the lawful repre-
sent rtives of God in founded society and to its laws. It has
the deepest respect for the oath of the citizen of a democracy
to support and obey the authority vested in the state. It
demands reverence for the oath taken by duly elected officials
to fulfil their own sacred obligation to God, country and
constituents. This system rather then being detrimental to
democracy is its strongest ally. Citizens who follow its
maxims must necessarily be the best citizens because they
recognize God's authority vested in man, and obey it to reach
God. 29
27 Cf. A. Manzoni, Ibid. , px>. 197-210, - "Sui precetti
delle Chiesa."
28 Cf. P. L. Taparelli, Ibid . . pp. 36-50, - Delia liberta.
29 Cf. Ibid.
. pp. 178-222, Dell 1 Aut or its, Delia Societa in
Concreto, Dell ' Autorita in Concreto, Gradi dell 'Autorita; Sovranit
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This system protects the home and home life. It
legislates agrinst destructive influences from the outside
which would limit its inherent rights. It prescribes
marital obligations end duties and demands reciprocal
respect end obedience from offspring. Prevalent dis-
sension of spouses, indifference to duties and maladjust-
ment of children result inp therefrom, a great source of
disorder to the state, are firmly dealt with by religious
authority invoking just principles founded in nature and
revelation.
Scholasticism not only seeks the good of the in-
dividual and the state in which he lives, but also applies
its principles to international relrtions and prescribes
that the seme authority, God, rules all and governs them,
in order that the individuals resident in each respective
state may attain their end and destiny.
The reason for authority in man's life is hereby ex-
plained in man's Author. Our resson of being, our possession
of life in the particular form in which it exists, is known in
our nature, which ^od made, and from God who made it. There
is strong influence brought to bear upon us, therefore, for
accepting this system, which explains the questions man seeks
to have answered, and which contributes the necessary means
to man's end, as better equipped to meet the exigences of
life and assist mm to his end.
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Nothing that has been spid in criticism of end
disagreement with the funds mental philosophy upon which
Dewey predicates his system of education is to be taken
as derogatory of his schoolroom methodology. Insofar as
method of presentation and instruction is concerned, John
Dewey must be recognized as a great contributor to educa-
tion and one of the outstanding educators of modern times.
In the practical problems of the schoolroom, Dewey's
prominent success was the manner of awakening interest and
quickening effort. In the practical educative process, his
thesis proposed that instead of considering school subjects
as to be perpetrated on the child ,30 thought must first
be given to understanding the child's experience and that
in proportion to the degree in which interests are aroused
in presented subjects, satisfactory learning results would
follow*SI
Dewey's basic claim with respect to the child's edu-
cational development, that as much interest and effort must
be combined in the greatest possible measure, is accepted
30 Cf . John Dewey, The Child and the Curriculum
.
(Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1902), p. 35.
31 Cf . John Dewey, Interest and "Effort in Educat ion
.
(Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Company, 1913), p. 62.
"What is needed is not an inventory of personal motives
which we suppose children to have, but a consideration of their
powers
.
their tendencies in action, and the ways in which these
can be carried forward by a given subject matter."
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by scholastics in their educative endeavors to accomplish
self-rerlizat ion ps well es to acquire self-control.
The scholastic system endeavors to use in behalf of
the educated, every prudent scientific advantage which may
be offered to provide the most successful means of correctly
developing the child as well as of promoting the fundamental
end necessary tenets of education,
E. Summary .
In this chapter an attempt has been made to establish
the sounder principles of education based upon fundamental
tenets as learned by a priori and a posteriori reasoning.
Regarding the first fundamental principle considered,
the makeup of "end," it would seem that the pragmatic view
based upon the positivistic principles of the acquirement of
knowledge is incomplete and unsatisfactory to man, who in all
his normal practical dealings in life knows why he is doing
something or where he is going. The synonomous use of ends
as means end means as ends is certainly insufficient as a
directive in collective action. This principle in itself and
as applied to education is too uncertain a process to direct
man in living life not to mention the attainment of s higher
goal. Self-realization is a worthy aspiration, but self-
control is no less a consideration for man or society.
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Concerning the evaluation in regard to the viewpoint on
values, it would seem that the variable, ohenging, relative
standards proposed by the instrumentalist system is inconsiderate
of the dignity of man and leads to egoism or skepticism v/hich
inflates or deteriorates the individual accepting the prin-
ciples of relative values, tends to destroy the harmonious
relations of individuals in society and discredits the author-
ity needed for proportionate community, national or inter-
national life.
The acceptance of naturalism seems to be unworthy as
a principle of direction suitable to the dignity and makeup
of man, who is something greater than an animal and more than
a machine. It seems too pessimistic in confining man f s entire
career of life to such a brief space as mortal life filled
with excessive evils which naturalism breeds.
The instrumentalist system displays its greatest weak-
ness in ascribing man-made limits to the sanctions of moral
actions. The inevitable result, as history attests, will be
a dissatisfactory distribution of burdens and burses in
smaller community life and selfish demonstration of might
making right in international relations.
Acknowledging every constructive effort of John Dewey
in the cause of education in his classroom methods, it would
seem that the practical administration of the fundamental
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principles of his educe tional philosophy cennot meet with
the success so enthusiastically claimed for them by adherents
and followers.
The thesis began with consideration of the opportune-
ness end importance of the consideration of evaluating and
revaluating in this hour of mundene distress the fundamentals
of educption. It concludes with the reiteration of the sound
principles of scholasticism as offered in contradistinction
to those of the school of the pragmatic instrumentalists.
To man who asks, "!Vhy?" scholasticism gives a sound
explanation as to his cause, his purpose, and his destiny.
To the individual who queries, "What?" it explains his com-
plete entity, supernatural as well as natural, and the force
which conserves him in his own being and in society. To the
inquisitor who questions, "How?" it outlines the laws of life,
discerned in man*s nature and manifested by his Maker, with
an adequate sanction to command and demand observance. To
the seeker of complete satisfaction who inquires, "Whence?"
it offers the only answer worthy of man, a correct full life
in this world and a compensating complete existence in the
next
.
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ABSTRACT
Interpreters of events ere of the unanimous conviction
that the world is in a critical period of history. Great and
strange forces ere at -vork in the midst of mundane turmoil.
There is greater need than ever before in the life of the world
for the establishment of correct principles of true education
to protect men from self-destruction. "Education must master
sameness and difference, permanence and ehenge to fortify the
virtues of men for the protection of civilization today and
its continued improvement in the future.
Education is the science or art of the directed develop-
ment of man, precisely as he is man in the reproductive process
of society. Philosophy is the profound knowledge of the order
of , man, of causes and principles which direct man to the purpose
of his being as a social individual. Educational philosophy
is the resultant of the projection of philosophical principles
in bringing man to the highest accomplishments of his nature.
If these principles are false, the whole fabric of society will
suffer. Educational philosophy has a grave duty to man and
society, therefore, of examining and re-examining the principles
of the integral development of man in learning and seeking good.
The thesis respects this educative need and endeavors to
evaluate the educational principles of John Dewey and scholasti-
cism in the light of potential or actual production and in the
scope of their teleologies! effects. It seeks to answer the
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ohellenge to education by establishing an indestructable
foundation upon which the dignified and worthy life of men
may be built.
In 1939, educators throughout the nation paid fitting
tribute to John Dewey on the occasion of his eightieth birth-
day. The Library of Living Philos ophers . edited by Paul A.
Schilpp, has accorded him the dignity of publishing its first
volume, The Philosophy of John Dewey . His preeminence, there-
fore, in the minds of his collepgues and the magnitude of the
practise of his theories afford the opportunity of selecting
his standards and methods as representative for comparison with
the doctrines of scholasticism, the accepted teachings of the
Catholic Church a.3 recommended by Pope Leo XIII in the Encycli-
cal, "The Study of Scholastic Philosophy" and by Pope Pius XI
in the Encyclical, "Christian Education of Youth."
The life of John Dewey, his schooling, teachings, writ-
ings, travels end accomplishments are considered with the view
of appreciating the sum of the experience of* the educator who
believes th?t experience is education.
The philosophy of John Dewey covers such a vast area
that it is necessary to delimit consideration of his general
philosophical views as they affect man who is the subject of
education. To him, the fundamental idea of the primary subject
matter of philosophical inquiry is a continuously interconnected
field of experience in which there are three ereas represented
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in the form of three oonoentrio circles, one occupied by re-
flective thought or logical inquiry; the second, the practical
or utilitarian modes of human experience and their inter-
relations; the third, the socio-cultural world or society
which generates the social questions. His philosophy finds
its origin in what is uncertain in the subject matter of ex-
perience. These are tested in action. Education is the
process in which man finds the accomplishment of transformation
from hypothesis to deliberately conducted progress.
In this transformation, Dewey considers every means as
a temporary end until it is attained. The end, adhering in
the means, is but the generation of consequences which gives
activity meaning and motive. These ends or means are always
relative. The end of education of the individual in his view
is the participation of the individual in the social con-
sciousness of the race which stimulates activity in social
relationships. Social life gives unity and background to
efforts and results in a development of new attitudes and new
interests regarding experience. This reconstruction is a
process in which successive progress and goal are one and the
same without recognition of any standard or end outside
education itself. The fundamental method of social progress
and reform is an evolution of sharing the social consciousness
in individualistic and socialistic ideals. The community, as
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seen by hira, has a paramount duty to foster this mode of
living, formulate its purposes end organize means and resources
in the direction it wishes to more.
Scholasticism, Aristotelian in its makeup, is a
rationalistic method applying dialectic to the study of nature,
human nature and supernatural truth. Reason is not subordinated
to authority in any unworthy sense. While scholasticism
acknowledges revelation, it uses reason, as far as possible,
to verify dogmas of faith. It is a philosophical system of
moderate realism and recognizes that all knowledge is derived
from sense knowledge but claims that intellectual knowledge
differs from sense knowledge, not only in degree but in kind.
It reproves both innatism and sensism, opposes subjectivism
and holds that there is an external world which is real in
itself and independent of our thoughts. Matter and form are
the fundamental bases of both organic and inorganic nature.
Scholastics maintain that the nature of man is an in-
dividual materiality existing with a conjoined spiritual
principle, the source of thought activity. This is calDe d
the soul, the principle of man's life which is held to be
immortal. Man also possesses freedom of the will with the
capability of self-determination. Scholastics recognize a
cause for man's being and for the existence of the world in
which man lives. Ethically, it rests upon the fundamental
notion that happiness, the supreme good of man, is the real-
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ization of the complete actuality of one's nature and that
virtue is an essential means to that end. It holds that man
is by nrture a social being who must function for the common
welfare.
Scholrsticism applies the philosophy of life to edu-
cation in a reasonable manner. It tepches that man has a
definite end proportionate to man's nature and that this end
by its very nature is ultimate. It holds that this end, which
is permanent, cannot be found in the individual, who is
transient, nor in temporal society, nor in finite matter.
For the prosecution of a well-ordered life, the scholastic
requires the training of character to obtain stability of
action or conduct governed by reason. Scholasticism main-
tains that guiding principles of the conduct of life, predi-
cted on the purpose of life as found in human nature, are
a fundamental norm of life to prepare man for what he must be
and do in order to acquire his destiny.
Scholasticism recognizes that there is e relation be-
tween the creature and the Creator, that man neither made
himself, nor can sustain himself indefinitely; that man cennot
make himself something greater than his fundamental neture
will permit. In its system of education, therefore, it recog-
nizes the inflexibilities of these fundamentals which are
constant and stable but admits whatever variables may improve
man's life in the limits of end in accordance with his nature.
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In addition to ell that reason may supply, soholast ioisra
admits revelation as a supplement to the principles of edu-
cation found in nrture by reason, and the tenets of the great
Teacher, Christ. Religion is a necessary part of man f s life
and education because of man f s dependence on his Creator. It
is exacted as an adequate sanction of morality to supply
essential motivation to the individual to seek his proper end.
It is required for the structure of society in order that
mutual acknowledgement and reciprocation of individual rights
and obligations may be recognized.
Scholasticism seeks the education of all of man f s
inherent capabilities to a full life here and a complete
life hereafter. It is universal and objective in its appli-
cation regardless of time, place, or social conditions.
Comparisons of the fundamental tenets of the two
divergent schools present a more comprehensive search and
research for fitting educational principles necessary for
proper development. A re-examine t ion of the underlying
principles of these schools in the precariousness of these
critical times provides a profitable opportunity of appraising
the methods and doctrines expounded, and of calculating which
is better equipped to meet the conditions of our incredulous,
skeptical, selfish world.
Regarding the first fundamental principle based upon
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the makeup of "end," a pragmatic viewpoint based upon posi-
tivistic principles of knowledge does not seem to be complete
enough to satisfy man who knows in the common exigencies of
life where he is going and ?/hy he is doing certain deeds.
The process seems too uncertain to promote proper self-
satisfaction. Moreover, self-control is no less a consider-
ation for the good of society.
The indef initeness in the situation created by these
principles is certainly insufficient to be a directive of
collective action.
The variable, changing, relative standards proposed
by the instrumentalist system are inconsiderate of the
proper dignity of man. They lead to egoism and skepticism.
Relative values will either inflate or impair the individual
in his reactions in social relations and discredit the
authority absolutely needed for correct pnd proportionate
community, national, or international life.
Naturalism, as a doctrine, is unworthy of man who is
more than an pnimal. It is too pessimistic in confining
man^ career to finite life and breeds excessive evils in
being inept to control the selfishness of mai
.
The greatest weakness of the instrumentalist system
is the delimiting of the sanction of moral potions to man-
made subscription. History attests that man contributes to his
own unmaking in following this norm with unequal distribution of

xxiv
goods in community life and definite selfish demonstration of
might determining right in international relations.
Every constructive force initiated by John Dewey in
his classroom methodology for awakening interest and quicken-
ing effort is duly recognized. Dewey's practical contributions
to education are acknowledged. Every prudent scientific ad-
vrntage he offers to provide successful means for aiding the
development of the child is accorded proportionate consider-
ation. The fundamental weaknesses in his system, already
pointed out, seem to preclude the success so enthusiastically
claimed for it by adherents and followers.
Only basic and fundamental principles, making certainty
possible and security probable, principles considerate of man
and worthy of man will suffice to establish education in its
proper place and convince men of its merits.
Scholasticism gives man a sound explanation of his
cruse, purpose end destiny. It establishes principles of life
discerned in men's nature and manifested by man's Maker. It
provides a proper sanction to influence man to observe ade-
quately his reason of being and to prosecute the purpose of
his life. It answers the fundamental queries that vex the minds
of men and prompts man to the leading of a correct full life
here for the attainment of a complete existence hereafter.
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